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ABSTRACT  —  Since  its  entry  into  force  in  2000,  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  has  become  largely  synonymous  with  
human-­‐rights  adjudication  in  the  UK.  In  particular,  the  notion  of  common-­‐law  constitutional  rights  was  largely  
eclipsed   by   the   new   legislation.   However,   in   recent   years,   against   the   background   of   political   uncertainty  
concerning   the   future   of   the   Act,   the   UK   Supreme   Court   has   begun   to   place   renewed   emphasis   upon   the  
common  law  as  a  source  of  fundamental  rights  and  values.  In  the  light  of  those  phenomena,  this  article  examines  
the  potential  of  the  common  law  as  a  vehicle  for  the  enforcement  of  human  rights.  In  particular,  it  compares  
the  capacity  of  the  common  law  with  that  of  the  Act  by  reference  to  three  vectors  by  reference  to  which  the  
nature  of  a   judicial   system  of  human-­‐rights  protection  may  be  characterised.  The   three  vectors   respectively  
concern  the  normative  reach  of   the  system,  the  rigour  with  which   it  equips  courts  to  uphold  rights,  and  the  
degree  of  constitutional  resilience  that  rights  exhibit  in  the  face  of  adverse  legislative  or  administrative  action.  
It  is  argued  that  these  three  aspects  of  human-­‐rights  adjudication  sit  in  relationship  with  one  another,  and  that  
it  is  only  by  considering  the  ways  in  which  they  interact  that  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  common  law’s  potential  
can  be  fully  calibrated  and  assessed.    
  
Public  lawyers  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  used  to  living  through  interesting  times.  Indeed,  ever  since  
the  big-­‐bang  reforms  of  the  first  Blair  government  in  the  late  1990s,  the  British  constitution  —  in  a  
way  that  perhaps  only  an  unwritten,  unentrenched,  easy-­‐to-­‐amend  constitution  like  the  UK’s  can  —  
has   found   itself   in   an   almost-­‐constant   state   of   change.   Today,   the   outcome   of   the   2014   Scottish  
independence  referendum  is  a  particularly  obvious  engine  of  ongoing  constitutional  reform,  the  trend  
—  or,  as  perhaps  more  accurately  describes  the  British  way,  drift  —  towards  a  more-­‐federalized  model  
being   increasingly   hard   to   dispute.1  The  prospect   of   radical   constitutional   reform   is   not,   however,  
confined  to  internal  institutional  redesign  in  a  post-­‐devolution  era.  The  UK’s  external  relationships  are  
also  on  the  table  in  a  way  and  to  an  extent  that  they  have  not  been  for  several  decades.  This  is  most  
clearly   evident   in   relation   to   membership   of   the   European   Union   (EU),   the   wisdom   of   an   in-­‐out  
referendum  having  been  a  major  issue  in  the  2015  general-­‐election  campaign.  Meanwhile,  repeal  of  
the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  (HRA)  and  the  enactment  of  a  ‘British  Bill  of  Rights’  was  proposed  by  the  
Conservative  Party  in  its  2015  manifesto.2  Indeed,  in  a  paper  published  in  2014  the  Party  went  further  
still,  advocating  reforms  that  were  acknowledged  to  be  capable  of  triggering  the  UK’s  withdrawal  from  
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University  of  Cambridge,  February  2015.    
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the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  on  account  of  their  incompatibility  with  Britain’s  
obligations  under  that  treaty.3    
Although  such  radical  changes  remain  unlikely  —  if  not,  any  longer,  unthinkable  —  engaging  in  the  
constitutional   futurology   invited   by   these   possibilities   is   both   useful   and   valuable.   This   article  
therefore  evaluates  the  state  of  domestic  human-­‐rights  law  by  way  of  comparing  it  with  the  forms  
and  degrees  of  protection  of  human  rights  that  are  presently  available  thanks  to  the  presence  on  the  
statute  book  of  the  HRA  and  the  UK’s  being  a  party  to  the  ECHR.  More  particularly,  the  article  considers  
the  extent   to  which   the  doctrine  of   common-­‐law  constitutional   rights   is,  or  has   the  demonstrable  
potential  to  develop  into,  a  substitute  for  the  existing  system  of  rights  protection  rooted  in  the  HRA  
and  the  ECHR.    
This  analysis  serves  two  useful  purposes.  First,  it  enables  us  to  understand  what  (this  aspect  of)  our  
domestic  constitutional  order  looks  like,  so  as  (for  instance)  to  be  able  better  to  appreciate  the  nature  
of   its   relationship   with   relevant   European   influences   for   as   long   as   the   latter   persist.   Second,  
considering  elements  of  the  constitution  that  are  inherent  —  rather  than,  to  some  extent,  grafted  on  
by  operation  of  potentially  transitory  statutory  or  external  influences  —  serves  to  identify  the  terrain  
upon  which  any  debate  about  further  constitutional  reform  must  take  place.  It  is,  for  example,  likely  
that  even  if  a  scorched-­‐earth  policy  were  pursued  by  means  of  HRA-­‐repeal  and  ECHR-­‐withdrawal,  this  
would  be  followed  by  some  form  of  domestic  bill  of  rights.  Yet  the  extent  to  which  the  framers  of  such  
legislation  would  have  the  luxury  of  painting  upon  a  blank  canvas  necessarily  turns,  to  some  degree  
at  least,  upon  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  common  law’s  innate  commitment  to  rights.    
In  order  to  realize  the  objectives  sketched  above,  the  article  will  examine  and  compare  common-­‐law  
and  HRA-­‐ECHR  rights  protection  with  respect  to  three  vectors  by  reference  to  which  the  nature  and  
potency   of   a   juridical   human-­‐rights   regime   can   be   plotted.   The   first   such   vector   concerns   the  
normative  reach  of  common-­‐law  and  HRA-­‐ECHR  rights.  Are  the  two  bodies  of  rights  co-­‐extensive,  or  
is   the   former   but   a   pale   shadow  of   the   latter?   The   second   vector   relates   to   the  protective   rigour  
evidenced  at  common  law  and  under  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  scheme  respectively.  Even  if  it  were  the  case  that  
the  common  law  acknowledged  all  —  or  most  or  some  —  of  the  rights  enshrined  in  the  Convention,  
would   courts   upholding   exclusively   common-­‐law   rights   have   at   their   disposal   adequate  protective  
instruments?  The  third  vector  concerns  the  notion  of  constitutional  resilience.  Convention  rights  —  
by  virtue  of  their  binding  effect  upon  the  UK  in  international  law  —  are  invested  with  a  particular  form  
of  legal  bite.  As  a  result,  the  constitutional  capacity  of  Parliament  to  reverse  interpretations  rendered  
under  section  3  of  the  HRA  and  to  ignore  declarations  issued  under  section  4  is  marginalized  if  not  
rendered  largely  notional.  However,  as  domestic  constructs,  common-­‐law  rights   inevitably   lack  the  
international-­‐law  purchase  that  Convention  rights  have,  raising  questions  about  the  extent,  if  any,  to  
which  they  might  be  considered  resilient  in  the  face  of  adverse  legislation.    
                                                                                                                          
3  Conservative  Party,  Protection  Rights  in  the  UK  (2014).  This  is  not,  however,  the  first  time  that  the  UK’s  
involvement  in  the  ECHR  has  been  fundamentally  reconsidered  at  the  highest  political  levels:  see  Ed  Bates,  
‘British  Sovereignty  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights’  (2012)  128  LQR  382;  Ed  Bates,  ‘The  UK  and  
European  Human  Rights:  A  Strained  Relationship  —  The  Long  View’  in  Katja  Ziegler,  Elizabeth  Wicks  and  
Loveday  Hodson  (eds),  The  UK  and  European  Human  Rights:  A  Strained  Relationship?  (Hart  2015).    
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It   will   be   argued   that   the   three   vectors   sit   in   relationship   with   one   another,   and   that   it   is   by  
understanding   the   nature   of   the   interactions   between   them   that  we   can   come   to   appreciate   the  
potential  of  common-­‐law  rights.  In  particular,  while  there  may  exist  a  normative  core  of  such  rights  
that  are  singled  out  for  particular  recognition,  the  common  law’s  commitment  to  rights  diminishes  as  
we  shift  from  the  core  to  the  normative  penumbra.  That  commitment  is  evidenced  by  the  protective  
lengths  to  which  the  common  law  is  prepared  to  go  in  relation  to  particular  rights,  such  lengths  being  
notably  greater  in  relation  to  rights  lying  at  or  close  to  the  normative  core.  In  turn,  such  protective  
endeavours   inform  the  extent  of  a  given  right’s  constitutional  resilience,  certain  (core)  rights  being  
especially  resistant  to  legislative  or  administrative  infraction.    
It  will  be  contended  that,  analysed  thus,  the  common  law  constitutes  a  potentially  potent  vehicle  for  
the  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights,  but  that  it  is  essential  that  points  of  distinction  —  as  well  as  
points  of  commonality  —  between  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  and  common-­‐law  regimes  be  acknowledged.  Two  
extreme  analyses  must  therefore  be  resisted.  It  would  be  unrealistic  to  argue  that  domestic  law  in  this  
area  is  so  extensive,  rigorous  and  resilient  as  to  render  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  essentially  redundant,  such  that  
(for  instance)  repeal  of  the  former  and  withdrawal  from  the  latter  are  prospects  that  can  be  met  with  
utter  equanimity.  However,  it  would  be  equally  mistaken  to  suppose  that  the  common-­‐law  and  HRA-­‐
ECHR   regimes   are   so   radically   different   that   the   absence   of   the   former   would   transform   judicial  
protection  of  human  rights   in  the  UK  beyond  all  recognition.  The  true  position,   it  will  be  argued,   is  
more  subtle  and  more  complex  than  either  of  these  bald  analyses  allows.    
Normative  Reach  
The  Idea  of  Common-­‐Law  Rights  
In   the   years   leading   up   to   the   enactment   and   activation   of   the   HRA,   the   notion   of   common-­‐law  
‘constitutional’  or  ‘fundamental’  rights  acquired  a  certain  prominence.  Particular  attention  was  paid  
to  the  right  of  access  to  court,4  which  was  held  to  encompass  a  right  of  access  to  confidential  legal  
advice,5  and  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression.6  Inevitably,  no  authoritative  catalogue  of  such  rights  
exists,  although  it  is  hard  to  dispute  the  proposition  that  such  rights  as  could  be  inferred  from  the  case  
law  appeared  to  occupy  a  terrain  substantially  narrower  than  that  occupied  by  the  Convention  rights.  
Indeed,  it  was  the  failure  of  domestic  law  to  protect  the  full  range  of  such  rights  that  underpinned  the  
desire  of   the  Blair   administration   to   legislate   so   as   to   see   ‘rights   brought  home’.7  The  paradoxical  
implication   was   that   while   Convention   rights   were   somehow   immanent   within   domestic   law,  
legislative  domestication  was  nevertheless  required.  That  paradox  is  echoed  by  the  juxtaposition  of  
rhetorical  claims  about  the  capacity  of  the  common  law  —  Lord  Donaldson  MR’s  assertion  that  ‘you  
have  to  look  long  and  hard  before  you  can  detect  any  difference  between  the  English  common  law  
and  the  principles  set  out  in  the  Convention’8  being  perhaps  the  best  example  —  with  the  practical  
                                                                                                                          
4  Eg  Raymond  v  Honey  [1983]  1  AC  1  (HL);    R  v  Lord  Chancellor,  ex  parte  Witham  [1998]  QB  575  (QBD).    
5  Eg  R  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department,  ex  parte  Leech  (No  2)  [1994]  QB  198  (CA).      
6  Eg  R  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department,  ex  parte  Simms  [2000]  2  AC  115  (HL).    
7  Rights  Brought  Home:  The  Human  Rights  Bill  (White  Paper,  Cm  3782,  1997).    
8  R  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department,  ex  parte  Brind  [1991]  1  AC  696,  717  (HL).  
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reality  of  domestic  courts’  unpreparedness  in  many  cases9  to  confer  upon  fundamental  rights  a  degree  
of  protection  the  equivalent  of  that  available  in  Strasbourg.    
This  apparent  paradox  is  resolvable  to  some  extent  by  reference  to  a  distinction  that  can  —  and  needs  
to  —  be  drawn  between  values  associated  with  the  common  law  and  rights  protected  by  it.  It  is  true  
that  the  Convention  embodies  rights  that  amount  to  specific  manifestations  of  values  that,  at  some  
level  of  abstraction,  are  reflected  in  the  English  common-­‐law  tradition.  However,  it  does  not  follow  
from  this  that  the  common  law  did,  or  does,  contain  a  catalogue  of  rights  that  equates  to  the  body  of  
rights  found  in  the  Convention.  To  possess  a  legal  right  arguably  implies  some  form  of  enforceability  
—  and,   in   the  public-­‐law   realm,   some  degree  of   ring-­‐fencing  against   the  prospect  of   legislative  or  
administrative  incursion.  It  was  in  these  senses  that  the  common  law  sometimes  fell  short.  For  all  that  
‘rights’   might   have   been   acknowledged   at   common   law,   practical   enforcement   was   limited   on  
occasion,  as  decisions  like  Brind10  and  Smith11  show.  Although  in  both  cases  it  was  acknowledged  that  
human  rights  were  at  stake,  the  courts’  capacity  to  protect  the  relevant  rights  was  limited  by  broad  
adherence  to  the  conventional  doctrinal  machinery  of  domestic  administrative  law.  In  particular,  the  
retention  in  such  cases  of  Wednesbury  unreasonableness  —  even  in  its  adapted,  ‘sub-­‐Wednesbury’  
guise12  —   as   the   operative   ground   of   review   places   in   some   doubt   the   extent   to  which   they   can  
properly  be  characterized  as  cases  evidencing  the  protection  of  ‘rights’  as  such,  as  distinct  from  cases  
decided   in   accordance  with   orthodox   administrative-­‐law  doctrine   albeit   informed  by   the   fact   that  
relevant  values  were  engaged.    
For  these  reasons,   it   is   important  to  approach  claims  about  common-­‐law  constitutional  rights  with  
some   caution.   It   is   far   from   clear   that   the  normative   range  of   the  human-­‐rights   values   immanent  
within  the  common  law  is  co-­‐extensive  with  the  rights  set  out  in  the  Convention,  while  those  values  
that  were  acknowledged  were  not  inevitably  translated  through  the  use  of  practical  adjudicative  tools  
into  meaningfully  enforceable  rights.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  no  viable  claim  can  be  made  to  the  
effect  that,  prior  to  the  HRA,  common-­‐law  rights  —  properly  so  called  —  existed.  Rather,  the  point  is  
that  such  claims  must  be  appropriately  qualified  if  revisionism  is  to  be  avoided.  There  were  certainly  
cases  in  which  the  courts  gave  glimpses  of  the  common  law’s  potential:  cases  in  which  some  degree  
of   ring-­‐fencing   was   secured   by   means   of   interpretive   methodology   and   more-­‐rigorous   oversight  
supplied  by  the  adoption  of  a   form  of   review  that  went  beyond  Wednesbury.13  It  would,  however,  
stretch  credibility  beyond  breaking  point  to  suggest  that  in  the  pre-­‐HRA  common  law  we  find  a  set  of  
domestic-­‐legal  human  rights   that  rendered  the  enactment  of   the  HRA  otiose.  And  so,   for   ‘bringing  
rights  home’,  read  ‘giving  domestic  legal  effect  to  rights  that  correspond  to  some  extent  with  values  
acknowledged  at  common  law’  —  a  less  catchy  slogan,  but  a  more  accurate  one.    
  
                                                                                                                          
9  Such  as  R  v  Ministry  of  Defence,  ex  parte  Smith  [1996]  QB  517  (CA).  
10  ibid.  
11  Smith  (n  9).    
12   See   generally   Sir   John   Laws,   ‘Wednesbury’   in   Christopher   Forsyth   and   Ivan   Hare   (eds),   The   Golden  
Metwand  and  the  Crooked  Cord  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1998).    
13  Such  cases  are  discussed  below.    
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The  Advent  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  
Once  the  HRA  entered  onto  the  scene,  common-­‐law  rights  quickly  found  themselves  in  its  shadow.  
And  while  this  development  is  intuitively  unsurprising,  it  is  worth  pausing  to  consider  what  might  lie  
behind  it.  Two  possibilities  arise.  The  first  turns  upon  a  characterization  of  common-­‐law  rights  as  little  
more   than  an  anticipatory   facsimile  of   certain  Convention   rights  —  placeholders  embraced  by   the  
courts  pending  incorporation  of  the  Convention.  On  this  view,  which  Lord  Rodger  appeared  to  endorse  
in  Watkins,14  common-­‐law  rights  could,  and  perhaps  even  should,  be  permitted  to  fall  by  the  wayside  
once  the  ECHR  —  the   ‘real  deal’,   to  use  a  term  that  Lord  Rodger  did  not  —  was   fully  domestically  
accessible.  As  Lord  Rodger  put  it,  in  developing  the  doctrine  of  common-­‐law  constitutional  rights,  the  
‘judges  were,  more  or  less  explicitly,  looking  for  a  means  of  incorporation  avant  la  lettre,  of  having  the  
common   law  supply   the  benefits  of   incorporation  without   incorporation’.15  Viewed  thus,  common-­‐
law   rights   amounted   to   little  more   than   a  device  deployed   in  order   to  mitigate   the   effects   of   the  
prohibition  identified  in  Brind  upon  ‘back-­‐door  incorporation’.16  For  the  reasons  given  above,  the  use  
of  that  device  did  not  always  bear  fruit  —  but,  in  any  event,  as  Lord  Rodger  went  on  to  say  in  Watkins,  
‘heroic  efforts’  of  the  type  evidenced  by  the  judges  who  had  developed  the  notion  of  common-­‐law  
rights  were  rendered  ‘unnecessary’  by  the  advent  of  the  HRA.17    
There   is,  however,   a   second  way  of   seeking   to  understand   (what  appeared,   for  a   time,   to  be)   the  
eclipse  of  common-­‐law  by  Convention  rights.  Whereas  Lord  Rodger’s  analysis  effectively  downplays  
the   normative   significance   and   longevity   of   common-­‐law   rights,   by   postulating   that   they   were  
essentially  makeshift  constructs,  an  alternative  narrative  offers  a  subtly  —  but  significantly  —  different  
account.  On   this   second   view,   the   overshadowing   of   common-­‐law   rights   is   a  merely   empirical,   as  
opposed  to  a  more  profoundly  normative,  phenomenon.  Claimants  began  to  argue,  and  courts  began  
to  decide  cases,  on  the  basis  of  the  rights  scheduled  to  the  HRA  because  they  had  become  readily  
accessible  and  conveniently  tabulated  —  not  because  common-­‐law  rights  had  been  either  displaced  
or  exposed  as  mere  portents  of  the  Convention  rights  that  were  to  come.  Support  for  this  version  of  
the  narrative  can  be  found  both  in  the  early  and  in  what  might  turn  out  to  the  late  case-­‐law  of  the  
HRA  era.    
An  obvious  example  of  the  former  is  Daly.18  Lord  Bingham’s  leading  speech  in  that  case  turned  almost  
entirely  upon  the  common-­‐law  right   to   legal  professional  privilege,   the   fact   that  applying  Article  8  
ECHR  would  have  yielded  the  same  result  being  mentioned  as  little  more  than  an  afterthought.  A  clear  
implication  of   Lord  Bingham’s   speech  was   that   common-­‐law  and  Convention   rights  would  co-­‐exist  
under   the  HRA.   And  what  was   implicit   in   Lord   Bingham’s   speech  was   explicit   in   Lord   Cooke’s.   He  
considered   it   to  be   ‘of  great   importance  …  that   the  common   law  by   itself   is  being  recognized  as  a  
sufficient  source  of  the  fundamental  right  of  confidential  communication  with  a  legal  adviser’.19  Lord  
                                                                                                                          
14  Watkins  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2006]  UKHL  17,  [2006]  2  AC  395.    
15  ibid  [64].    
16  Daly  (n  8)  762  (Lord  Ackner).    
17  Watkins  (n  14)  [64].    
18  R  (Daly)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2001]  UKHL  26,  [2001]  2  AC  532.  
19  ibid  [30].    
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Cooke  went  on  to  say  that  ‘some  rights  are  inherent  and  fundamental  to  democratic  civilized  society.  
Conventions,   constitutions,  bills   of   rights   and   the   like   respond  by   recognising   rather   than   creating  
them’.20  Of  course,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  Daly  concerned  the  right  of  confidential  access  to  legal  
advice  —  a  right  that,  as  noted  above,  is  regarded  as  an  intimate  component  of  the  right  of  access  to  
court,   the   latter   being   a   right   to   which   the   common   law   has   demonstrated   a   longstanding  
commitment.  Daly   is  not   therefore  a  basis   for  any  grand  claims  about   the  equivalence   in  scope  of  
common-­‐law   and   Convention   rights;   it   does,   however,   provide   a   strong   antidote   to   claims   that  
common-­‐law  rights  were  swept  aside  by  the  HRA.    
Although,   for   some   commentators,   such   a   reading   of  Daly  was   subsequently   placed   in   doubt   by  
decisions   such  as  Watkins  —   in  which,  according   to  Brice  Dickson,   ‘the   coffin   lid  on  constitutional  
rights  was  well  and  truly  screwed  down’21  —  the  relevance  of  the  common  law  in  this  area  has  since  
been  boldly  reasserted.  In  a  series  of  judgments,  including  Osborn  v  Parole  Board,22  Kennedy  v  Charity  
Commission,23  R  (HS2  Action  Alliance  Ltd)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Transport,24  A  v  BBC25  and  R  (Evans)  
v  Attorney-­‐General26  the  Supreme  Court  has  placed  renewed  emphasis  upon  the  common  law  as  a  
source   of   fundamental   constitutional   values   and   rights.27  Against   this   background,   Lady   Hale   has  
suggested  that  ‘UK  constitutionalism’  is  ‘on  the  march’,  meaning  that  ‘there  is  emerging  a  renewed  
emphasis   on   the   common   law   and   distinctively   UK   constitutional   principles   as   a   source   of   legal  
inspiration’.28    
Common-­‐Law  Resurgence    
To  what,  however,  does  this  common-­‐law  resurgence  actually  amount?  Three  strands  within  it  can  
usefully   be   distinguished.   The   first   —   and   the   most   uncontroversial   —   concerns   common-­‐law  
resilience.   It  amounts   to  the  modest  proposition  that  common-­‐law  rights  survive  the  HRA.  As  Lord  
Reed   put   it   in  Osborn,   the   Act   ‘does   not   …   supersede   the   protection   of   human   rights   under   the  
common  law  or  statute,  or  create  a  discrete  body  of  law  based  upon  the  judgments  of  the  European  
                                                                                                                          
20  ibid  [30].  
21  Brice  Dickson,  Human  Rights  and  the  United  Kingdom  Supreme  Court  (OUP  2013)  28.    
22  [2013]  UKSC  61,  [2014]  AC  1115.  
23  [2014]  UKSC  20,  [2014]  2  WLR  808.  
24  [2014]  UKSC  3,  [2014]  1  WLR  324.    
25  [2014]  UKSC  25,  [2014]  2  WLR  1243.    
26  [2015]  UKSC  21.    
27  For  discussion,   see  Roger  Masterman  and  Se-­‐shauna  Wheatle,   ‘A  Common  Law  Resurgence   in  Rights  
Protection?’  [2015]  EHRLR  57;  Richard  Clayton,  ‘The  Empire  Strikes  Back’  [2015]  PL  3;  Dinah  Rose,  What’s  
the  Point  of  the  Human  Rights  Act?  (Politeia  2015).      
28  Lady  Hale,  ‘UK  Constitutionalism  on  the  March?’  (Constitutional  and  Administrative  Law  Bar  Association  
Conference,  12  Juyly  2014)  <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-­‐140712.pdf>  accessed  24  March  
2015.  See  also  Lord  Neuberger,  ‘“Judge  not,  that  ye  be  not  judged”:  Judging  judicial  decision-­‐making’  (F  A  
Mann  Lecture,  29  January  2015)  <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-­‐150129.pdf>  accessed  24  
March  2015.  
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court’.29  Such  a  view  tells  strongly  against  the  view  advanced  by  Lord  Rodger  that  common-­‐law  rights  
were   nothing   more   than   a   disposable   constructs   fashioned   to   secure   ‘incorporation   without  
incorporation’,30  but  to  be  cast  aside  as  redundant  upon  HRA’s  entry  into  force.    
The  second  strand  that  emerges  from  the  resurgence  jurisprudence  relates  to  the  notion  of  common-­‐
law  primacy,  according  to  which  the  Convention  plays  second  fiddle  to  the  common  law.  This  notion  
carries   two   implications.  One   is   essentially   pragmatic   in   nature,   and   is   reflected   in   Lord   Toulson’s  
observation   in   Kennedy   that,   since   the   activation   of   the   HRA,   there   has   been   a   ‘baleful   and  
unnecessary  tendency  to  overlook  the  common  law’.31  Not  only,  on  this  view,  should  the  common  law  
not  be  passed  over:  it,  rather  than  the  Convention,  should  form  the  focal  point  when  human-­‐rights  
arguments  are  made.  As  Lord  Mance  said,  also  in  Kennedy,  ‘[T]he  natural  starting  point  in  any  dispute  
is   to   start  with  domestic   law,   and   it   is   certainly  not   to   focus  exclusively  on   the  Convention   rights,  
without  surveying  the  wider  common   law  scene.’32  The  other  aspect  of  common-­‐law  primacy  goes  
deeper.   It   holds   that   it   is   not  merely   fitting  on   a   pragmatic   level   that   the   common   law   should  be  
prioritized  when  claims  are  framed,  but  also,  and  more  fundamentally,  that  common-­‐law  rights  form  
nothing  less  than  the  normative  anchor-­‐point  in  this  area.  As  Lord  Reed  put  it  in  Osborn,  ‘Human  rights  
continue  to  be  protected  by  our  domestic  law,  interpreted  and  developed  in  accordance  with  the  Act  
when  appropriate.’33  According  to  this  view,  common-­‐law  rights  are  no  mere  sideshow  that,  at  best,  
gloss  the  Convention:  to  the  contrary,  it  is  the  Convention  that  augments  the  common  law.  It  must,  
however,  be  acknowledged  that   if   this   is   the  nature  and  direction  of   the  relationship  between  the  
common  law  and  the  Convention,  its  outworking  has,  so  far,  taken  place  largely  beneath  the  radar.    
The   third  strand  that  can  be   identified  within   the   resurgence   jurisprudence  concerns  common-­‐law  
dynamism.  At  its  most  modest,  this  notion  implies  that  since  the  HRA’s  inception  the  common  law  has  
continued  not  only  to  exist,  but  also  to  evolve.  That  the  common  law  is  in  general  terms  a  dynamic  
institution   is   hardly   a   revelatory   insight.   Nevertheless,   the   Supreme   Court’s   affirmation   that   the  
common   law   has   continued   and   will   continue   to   evolve   in   this   particular   area,   the   HRA  
notwithstanding,   is   significant  —  not   least  because   it  dispels  any   suggestion   to   the  effect   that   the  
common  law  was  frozen  upon  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Act.  As  Toulson  LJ  said  in  R  (Guardian  News  
and  Media  Ltd)  v  City  of  Westminster  Magistrates’  Court,  ‘The  development  of  the  common  law  did  
not  come  to  an  end  on  the  passing  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998.’34  In  Kennedy,  Lord  Toulson  —  as  
he  had  by  then  become  —  reiterated  this  point  by  saying  that  ‘it  was  not  the  purpose  of  the  Human  
Rights  Act  that  the  common  law  should  become  an  ossuary’.35    
However,   the  notion  of  common-­‐law  dynamism  extends  beyond  the  negative  proposition   that   the  
HRA  has  not  precluded  the  common  law’s  development:  it  also  incorporates  the  positive  proposition  
                                                                                                                          
29  Osborn  (n  22)  [57].  
30  Watkins  (n  14)  [64].    
31  Kennedy  (n  23)  [133].    
32  ibid  [46].    
33  Osborn  (n  22)  [57].  
34  [2012]  EWCA  Civ  420,  [2013]  QB  618  [88].  
35  Kennedy  (n  23)  [133].  
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that  such  development  has  been  informed  and  stimulated  by  the  HRA.  As  Lord  Reed  said  in  Osborn,  
domestic   human-­‐rights   law   falls   to   be   developed   ‘in   accordance   with’   the   HRA   when   this   is  
appropriate.36  This  raises  a  question  about  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  influence  of  the  HRA  upon  the  
common  law.  At  one  extreme,  it  might  be  thought  to  imply  that  the  common  law  has  absorbed  —  or  
is  ineluctably  absorbing  —  all  that  the  Convention  has  to  offer,  such  that  the  common  law  has  —  or  
will  —  come  to  embody  the  Convention  rights  in  their  entirety.37  An  attraction  (from  one  perspective)  
of  this  view  is  that  repeal  of  the  HRA  or  withdrawal  from  the  ECHR  would  have  little  or  no  effect.  If  it  
were  the  case  that  the  common  law  had  ingested  all  that  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  regime  had  to  offer,  then  
casting  that  regime  to  one  side  would  amount  to  nothing  more  than  dispensing  with  an  empty  husk  
—   a   prospect   about   which   those   who   wish   to   preserve   domestic   courts’   capacity   to   uphold  
fundamental  rights  could  be  entirely  sanguine.    
Such  an  analysis  is,  however,  hard  to  sustain.  For  one  thing,  it  is  clear  that  the  bodies  of  common-­‐law  
and  Convention  rights  are  not  at  present  perfectly  aligned:  recently,  for  instance,  the  Supreme  Court  
exhibited  little  sympathy  for  the  suggestion  that  there  might  be  a  common-­‐law  right  to  vote  analogous  
to  that  which  is  found  in  the  Convention.38  For  another  thing,  assigning  such  radical  implications  to  
the  notion  that  the  common  law  is  being  impacted  by  the  HRA  is  inconsistent  with  both  the  gently  
evolutive  nature  of  the  common  law  and  with  such  clear  evidence  as  there  is  as  to  its  interaction  with  
Convention  rights.  When  we  consider  those  areas  of  law  in  which  such  interaction  is  discernible  —  
privacy   being   the   most   obvious   example   —   we   certainly   find   pre-­‐existing   common-­‐law   doctrine  
developing  in  the  light  of  Convention  rights  and  values.39  But  what  we  do  not  find  is  evidence  of  an  
across-­‐the-­‐board,  overnight  reimagining  of  the  common  law.  It  seems  likely,  therefore,  that  whatever  
it   is   that  has  been  going  on,  what  has  not   taken  place   is   the  wholesale  assimilation  of  Convention  
rights  into  the  common  law  such  that  the  latter  has  become  nothing  more  —  but  nothing  less  —  than  
an  imprint  of  the  former.    
Some  Conclusions  
That  Convention  and  common-­‐law  rights  are  neither  perfectly  aligned  nor  entirely  distinct  is  relatively  
clear.   The   more-­‐difficult   question   concerns   the   extent   of   such   alignment   as   exists.   By   way   of  
conclusion  to  this  section  of  the  article  and  introduction  to  its  remainder,  no  answer  to  that  question  
will   be   attempted,   but   two   factors   that  make   it   either   difficult   to   answer  or  misconceived  will   be  
offered.    
First,   perhaps   paradoxically,   the  normative   reach   of   common-­‐law   rights   is   an   ultimately   empirical  
question.  Given  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  common  law  generally,  and  the  acknowledged  dynamism  
of  common-­‐law  rights  in  particular,  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  why  the  body  of  such  rights  should  not  
                                                                                                                          
36  Osborn  (n  22)  [57].  
37  This   argument   turns   to   an   extent   on   whether   the   reception   of   Convention   rights   in   the   UK   can   be  
characterized   in  terms  of   internationalisation  as  distinct   from  mere  compliance,  on  which  see  Veronika  
Fikfak,  ‘English  Courts  and  the  “Internalisation”  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights?  —  Between  
Theory  and  Practice’  (2015)  4  Cambridge  Journal  of  International  and  Comparative  Law  (forthcoming).    
38  Moohan  v  Lord  Advocate  [2014]  UKSC  67,  [2015]  2  WLR  141.  
39  Eg  Campbell  v  MGN  Ltd  [2004]  UKHL  22,  [2004]  2  AC  457.  
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develop  in  a  way  that  over  time  yields  a  degree  —  perhaps  a  very  high  degree  —  of  convergence  with  
the  Convention.  However,  determining   the  present  degree  of   convergence   is   rendered  difficult  —  
indeed,   impossible  —  by  virtue  of   the  necessarily  obfuscatory  effect  of   the  HRA   itself.  For   reasons  
already  explored,  Convention  rights  have  tended  —  at  least  until  very  recently  —  to  occupy  the  centre-­‐
stage.  This  has  served  to  obscure  the  extent  to  which  cognate  common-­‐law  rights  might  exist  and,  if  
they   do,   how   extensive   they   might   be   and   how   they   might   compare   with   their   Convention  
counterparts.  If  the  trend  evidenced  by  recent  Supreme  Court  judgments  were  to  continue,  such  that  
greater   attention   were   paid   to   the   common   law,   and   a   merely   supporting   role   assigned   to   the  
Convention,   the  terrain  of   the  common   law  would   in   time  become  more-­‐clearly  defined.  For  now,  
however,  the  degree  to  which  the  body  of  common-­‐law  constitutional  rights  exceeds  its  pre-­‐HRA  self  
inevitably  remains  veiled,  at  least  to  some  extent,  in  obscurity.    
Second,  the  extent  of  alignment  between  common-­‐law  and  Convention  rights  is  rendered  uncertain  
because  —   thus   conceived  —   it   addresses   the   question   of   the   common   law’s   normative   reach   in  
isolation.  Such  an  approach   is,  however,  deficient,   since   the  question  of  normative   reach  can  only  
meaningfully  be   considered   in   conjunction  with   the  other   vectors  of  human-­‐rights  adjudication  —  
namely  protective  rigour  and  constitutional  resilience  —  identified  above.  Compare,  for  instance,  the  
sharply   contrasting   views   of   Trevor   Allan   and   Conor   Gearty.   Allan   places   great   emphasis   on   the  
normative   reach   of   the   common   law.  He   says   that   ‘[i]f  …   the   [HRA]   has   truly   changed   the   British  
constitution,   it   is   largely   because   it   was   planted   in   fertile   soil’,   and   that   ‘if   it   represents   a   true  
reconciliation  between  ideals  of  legality  and  democracy,  it  is  surely  one  that  the  common  law  had,  to  
a  substantial  degree,  already  provided  for’.40  Allan’s  view  diminishes  —  almost  to  vanishing  point  —  
the  normative  impact  of  the  Act,  characterizing  it  as  little  more  than  a  statutory  crystallization  of  that  
which  was  already  to  be  found  within  the  common  law’s  interstices.  Gearty,  in  contrast,  excoriates  
the   notion   of   the   ‘civil   libertarian   common   law’   as   a   ‘fantasy’   that   overlooks   what   he   dubs   ‘the  
partisanship  of  the  common  law  for  property  and  contract  rights’  and  its  service  ‘as  a  base  for  serial  
abuses  of  rights’.41    
Although  they  appear  to  be  implacably  inconsistent,  closer  analysis  suggests  a  possible  reconciliation  
that  acknowledges  the  pertinence  of  both  views.  Allan  is  surely  correct  that  the  common  law  betrays  
wide   and   deep   traces   of  normative   sympathy   for   values   that   underpin   some  —  perhaps  many  —  
Convention  rights.  But  Gearty  is  surely  right  to  point  out  that  this  has  not  always  delivered  tangible  
protection  of  relevant  rights.  Whether  —  and,  if  so,  to  what  extent  —  values  acknowledged  at  common  
law  can  be  regarded  as  rights  properly  so  called  turns  upon  the  rigour  with  which  courts  are  able  to  
protect  them  and  the  resulting  the  degree  of  constitutional  resilience  that  they  exhibit  in  the  face  of  
legislative  or  administrative   infraction.   It   follows  that   if  we  are  to  characterize  and  understand  the  
present  reality  and  future  potential  of  the  common  law,  its  normative  reach  must  be  examined  in  the  
light  of  distinct,  yet  cognate,  questions  about  its  protective  commitment  and,  ultimately,  the  resilience  
with  which  it  is  capable  of  investing  those  norms  that  it  acknowledges.  However,  as  will  be  shown  in  
the  following  sections,  this  analysis  does  not  yield  neatly  uniform  answers.  Rather,  the  proximity  of  a  
                                                                                                                          
40   Trevor   Allan,   ‘Parliament’s   Will   and   the   Justice   of   the   Common   Law:   The   Human   Rights   Act   in  
Constitutional  Perspective’  (2006)  59  CLP  27,  31.    
41  Conor  Gearty,  ‘On  Fantasy  Island:  British  politics,  English  judges  and  the  European  Convention  on  Human  
Rights’  [2015]  EHRLR  1,  2-­‐3.    
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given  value  to  the  common  law’s  normative  core  influences  the  answers  to  those  cognate  questions,  
thus   producing   a   complex   picture   that   defies   any   bald   exercise   in   characterisation   that   seeks   to  
advance  an  undifferentiated  account  of  how  common-­‐law  rights  work.    
Protective  rigour    
Of  what,   then,   is   the   common   law   capable  when   it   comes   to   the   protection   of   such   norms   as   it  
recognizes?  Since   the  concern  of   this  article   is,   at   least   in  part,   to  benchmark   the  potential  of   the  
common  law  against  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  regime,  it  is  worth  undertaking  a  side-­‐by-­‐side  comparison  of  the  
protective   approaches   that   they   respectively   adopt.   This   analysis  will   be   undertaken   by  means   of  
arguing   that   the   common-­‐law   approach  —   encapsulated   in   the   so-­‐called   principle   of   legality42  —  
discloses  three  particular,  closely  related  strands,  each  of  which  maps  clearly  —  albeit  not  perfectly  
—  onto  equivalent  aspects  of  the  protective  machinery  found  in  the  HRA-­‐ECHR.  The  three  pertinent  
strands  are  conceptual   reliance  upon  ultra  vires  reasoning;   recourse  to  statutory  construction  as  a  
primary  vehicle  for  protection;  and  the  provision  of  meaningful  justificatory  scrutiny.    
Ultra  Vires    
The  principle  of   legality   is  centrally  concerned  with  the  question  whether  the  defendant  has  acted  
within  or  beyond  its  statutory  authority.  As  Steyn  LJ  put  it  in  Leech  —  advancing  an  analysis  that  Lord  
Reed  recently  endorsed   in  Pham43  —  in  cases  of   this   type   ‘[i]t   is   important  not  to   lose  sight  of  the  
precise  nature  of   the  question   to  be   answered’:   ‘[t]he  question   is   simply  one  of  vires’.44  Thus,   for  
example,  the  question  in  Leech  itself  was  whether  a  prison  rule  according  powers  to  censor  prisoners’  
correspondence   was   authorized   by   the   provision   in   primary   legislation   under   which   the   rule   had  
purportedly   been  made.   The   answer   to   that   question   turned  —   as   we   will   see   below  —   on   the  
construction   of   the   relevant   statutory   provision;   for   present   purposes,   the   key   point   is   that   the  
lawfulness  of  the  impugned  secondary  legislation  was  conceptually  mediated  through  the  doctrine  of  
ultra  vires.    
The  conceptual  operation  of  the  principle  of  legality  is  echoed  by  the  way  in  which  Convention  rights  
can  be  conceptualised  under   the  HRA  as   interpretive  constraints  upon  statutory  authority.   Section  
6(1)  imposes  an  obligation  on  public  authorities  to  act  compatibly  with  Convention  rights.  However,  s  
6(1)   is   qualified   by   s   6(2),   which   relieves   public   authorities   of   the   obligation   to   comply   with   the  
Convention  to  the  extent  that  inconsistent  conduct  is  licensed  by  primary  legislation.  Whether  such  
conduct  is  statutorily  licensed  turns  upon  the  construction  of  the  relevant  statutory  provision,  which,  
s  3(1)  provides,  must  be  interpreted  compatibly  with  Convention  rights  —  and  hence  as  not  licensing  
infractions   of   them  —   unless   such   construction   is   impossible.   It   follows   that   whether   impugned  
administrative   or   legislative   action   is   permissible   under   the   HRA   scheme   turns   ultimately   upon  
whether  relevant  primary  legislation  authorises  infringement  of  the  right  concerned.  As  a  result,  as  
David  Feldman  has  written,  the  HRA  can  be  understood  to  have  extended  the  doctrine  of  substantive  
                                                                                                                          
42  Michael  Fordham  and  Thomas  de  la  Mare,   ‘Anxious  Scrutiny,  the  Principle  of  Legality  and  the  Human  
Rights  Act’  [2000]  JR  40.    
43  Pham  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2015]  UKSC  19  [118].  
44  Leech  (n  5)  208.  
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ultra  vires  by  ‘turning  incompatibility  with  Convention  rights  …  into  a  jurisdictional  error  of  law’  unless  
incompatible  conduct  is  licensed  by  the  relevant  primary  legislation.45  The  HRA  thus  does  not  break  
new  conceptual  ground  when  it  comes  to  the  protection  of  rights:  it  merely  utilises  and  extends  the  
vires-­‐based  technique  that  was  already  established  at  common  law.    
Statutory  Interpretation  
The  second  strand  within  the  principle  of  legality  concerns  the  interpretive  approach  by  reference  to  
which   the  dividing   line  between   intra  and  ultra  vires  official   action   is  drawn.   It   is  evident   that   the  
common-­‐law  doctrine  of  legality  employs  techniques  of  construction  comparable  to,  if  not  the  same  
as,  those  that  have  been  developed  by  the  courts  pursuant  to  the  interpretive  duty  under  s  3  of  the  
HRA.  To  some  extent,  the  relevance  of  statutory  interpretation  is  obvious  from  —  is,  indeed,  the  same  
point   as   —   the   fact   that   ultra   vires   forms   a   conceptual   vehicle   that   is   used   for   protecting   both  
common-­‐law   and   Convention   rights.   However,   it   is   clear   that   in   both   contexts,   the   approach   to  
statutory  interpretation  that  is  employed  is  anything  but  a  literal  one.  So  far  as  the  HRA  is  concerned,  
as  Lord  Nicholls  observed  in  Ghaidan,  s  3  imposes  upon  the  courts  an  interpretive  duty  ‘of  an  unusual  
and  far-­‐reaching  character’  such  that  the   intention  manifested  in  the   legislation  being  construed  is  
rendered  subservient  to  the  intention  manifested  in  s  3  itself.46  And  importantly,  whereas  certain  key  
pre-­‐HRA   cases,   perhaps  most   notably  Brind,   had   indicated   that   recourse   to   the   Convention   as   an  
interpretive   aid   was   appropriate   only   when   the   provision   being   construed   was   ambiguous,47   the  
interpretive  obligation  under  s  3  of  the  HRA  is  subject  to  no  such  limitation.    
The  acknowledgment  in  pre-­‐HRA  jurisprudence  of  such  an  ambiguity  trigger  may  be  thought  to  point  
towards  a  key  difference  between  the  common-­‐law  and  HRA   interpretive  models,   the   latter  being  
substantially  more  potent  given  its  applicability  irrespective  of  ambiguity.  However,  the  comparison  
is  in  fact  a  false  one.  It  is  true  that  when,  prior  to  the  HRA’s  inception,  UK  courts  were  invited  to  apply  
Convention   rights   qua   Convention   rights,   concerns   about   back-­‐door   incorporation   made   them  
disinclined  to  do  so  in  any  direct  way:  absent  ambiguity,  Convention  rights  were  not  generally  treated,  
pursuant  to  an  interpretive  approach,  as  vires  constraints  upon  statutory  authority.  It  is  for  this  reason  
that  notions  such  as  ‘anxious  scrutiny’48  sometimes  rang  hollow:  for  courts  to  ask  whether  a  defendant  
had  acted  Wednesbury  unreasonably  by  adopting  a  measure  that  compromised  a  right  is  qualitatively  
different  from  asking  whether  a  defendant  has  exceeded  hard-­‐legal  limits  upon  its  power  that  derive  
from  the  capacity  of  the  right  to  act  as  a  vires-­‐based  constraint.    
Importantly,  however,  a  different  approach  obtained  —  at  least  on  some  occasions  —  when  courts  
were  invited  to  decide  cases  on  the  basis  of  common-­‐law,  as  distinct  from  Convention,  rights.  In  such  
cases,   recourse   was   made   not   to   the   anxious-­‐scrutiny   doctrine   but   to   the   principle   of   legality.  
                                                                                                                          
45  David   Feldman,   ‘Convention   Rights   and   Substantive  Ultra   Vires’   in   Christopher   Forsyth   (ed),   Judicial  
Review  and  the  Constitution  (Hart  2000)  253.    
46  Ghaidan  v  Godin-­‐Mendoza  [2004]  UKHL  30,  [2004]  2  AC  557  [30].    
47  Brind  (n  8)  747–8  (Lord  Bridge),  760–2  (Lord  Ackner).  
48  Bugdaycay  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [1987]  AC  514  (HL)  531  (Lord  Bridge).    
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Contrasting  the  decisions  in  Witham49  and  Smith50  is  instructive  in  this  regard.  In  the  latter  case,  which  
concerned   the   legality   of   a   policy   prohibiting   gays   and   lesbians   from   serving   in   the   British   armed  
forces,  the  right  to  respect  for  private  life  under  Article  8  ECHR  was  clearly  relevant.  However,  there  
was  no  question  of  that  right  operating  as  a  hard  constraint  upon  the  relevant  legal  power.  The  most  
that   the   court  was   prepared   to   do  was   to   determine  whether,   bearing   in  mind   the   human-­‐rights  
context,  the  policy  was  unreasonable  —  which,  the  court  concluded,  it  was  not.    
The  reasoning  in  Witham  —  in  which  a  common-­‐law  right  was  in  play  —  was  different.  The  question  
was   whether   subordinate   legislation   concerning   court   fees   was   invalid   on   account   of   its  
incompatibility  with  the  constitutional  right  of  access  to  courts.  Holding  that  it  was,  Laws  J  observed  
that   ‘although   the   common   law   does   not   generally   speak   in   the   language   of   rights’,   the   idea   of  
common-­‐law  constitutional  rights  could  —  and  does  —  consist  in  the  proposition  that  they  ‘cannot  be  
abrogated  by  the  state  save  by  specific  provision  in  an  Act  of  Parliament,  or  by  regulations  whose  vires  
in  main  legislation  specifically  confers  the  power  to  abrogate’.51  In  this  way,  it  is  the  principle  of  legality  
—  more  specifically,  the  process  of  statutory  construction  —  that  breathes  legal  life  into  common-­‐law  
values  that  would  otherwise  remain  no  more  than  that.52  Thus,  to  the  extent  that  common-­‐law  rights  
can  be  said  to  be  established  through  the  principle  of  legality,  they  necessarily  consist  as  the  reciprocal  
counterpart  to  the  legal  incapacity  which  results  from  the  strict  construction  of  the  relevant  statute.  
Common-­‐law  doctrine   and   the  HRA   thus  march  hand-­‐in-­‐hand,   in   that   both  operate   so   as   to   deny  
administrative  and  (most)53  legislative  actors  any  authority  in  the  first  place  to  infringe  common-­‐law  
and  Convention  rights  respectively.    
Justificatory  Scrutiny  
The  third  —  and  sometimes  overlooked  —  strand  within  the  principle  of  legality  concerns  justificatory  
scrutiny.  This  notion  is  clearly  well-­‐established  under  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  scheme,  proportionality  review  
—  which  serves  to  distinguish  legitimate  state  action  from  infractions  of  the  Convention  in  relation  to  
many  of  the  non-­‐absolute  rights  —  being  its  epitome.  A  great  deal  has  been  written  about  whether,  
now  that  proportionality  is  an  established  feature  of  adjudication  under  the  HRA,  it  should,  perhaps  
through  some  process  of  cross-­‐fertilization,  be  embraced  as  a  universal  vehicle  for  substantive  review,  
so  as  to  apply  in  both  HRA  or  in  ‘regular’  judicial-­‐review  cases.  Powerfully  though  the  case  for  such  an  
approach  has  been  put,54  it  has  not  been  made  out.  Proportionality  makes  little  sense  in  cases  that  do  
not   concern   human   rights   or   comparably   valuable   norms   that   are   judged   to  warrant   the   form   of  
justificatory   scrutiny   supplied   by   proportionality. 55   Meanwhile,   attempts   to   establish   that  
                                                                                                                          
49  Witham  (n  4).    
50  Smith  (n  9).    
51  Witham  (n  4)  581.    
52  For  a  further,  and  more  recent,  example  see  Evans  (n  26)  (Lord  Neuberger).    
53  The  UK  Parliament  being  the  obvious  exception.    
54  Paul  Craig,  ‘Proportionality,  Rationality,  Review’  [2010]  NZ  L  Rev  265.    
55  Tom  Hickman,  ‘Problems  for  Proportionality’  [2010]  NZ  L  Rev  303;  R  (Rotherham  Metropolitan  Borough  
Council)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Business,  Innovation  and  Skills  [2015]  UKSC  6  [47]  (Lord  Sumption).    
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administrative  law  has  undergone  some  sort  of  ‘righting’  process56  —  such  that  the  whole  enterprise,  
or  at  least  the  substantial  majority  of  it,  now  concerns  the  protection  of  rights  and  is  thus  the  proper  
preserve   of   proportionality   review  —   are   highly   problematic.   There   is   no   convincing   evidence   to  
suggest  that  ordinary  judicial-­‐review  principles  have  been  overwhelmed  by  the  notion  of  rights,  and  
plenty   of   indications   to   the   contrary; 57   equally,   although   the   jettisoning   of   Wednesbury  
reasonableness   in   favour   of   proportionality   has   been   judicially   contemplated, 58   the   courts   have  
conspicuously  declined  to  take  that  step.  
Rejection  of  the  view  that  proportionality  should  be  embraced  as  a  panacea  might  be  thought  to  imply  
that  it  should  instead  be  conceptualized  as  an  exotic  concept  whose  role  is  limited  to  cases  involving  
Convention  rights  and  whose  presence  within  municipal   law   is  parasitic  upon  the  HRA.   It  might,   in  
turn,   be   suggested   that   the   repeal   of   the   HRA   would   terminate   domestic   courts’   flirtation   with  
proportionality,   leading   to   a   return   to   the   orthodoxy   of   Wednesbury.   However,   this   does   not  
necessarily  follow.  For  one  thing,  concerns  that  appeared  to  inhibit  the  adoption  of  proportionality  in  
pre-­‐HRA  cases  have,  at  least  to  some  extent,  faded  away  in  the  light  of  experience  gained  during  the  
currency  of  the  Act.  The  almost-­‐histrionic  analyses  of  proportionality  advanced  by  Lords  Lowry  and  
Ackner   in   Brind,   for   instance,   were   premised   upon   the   notion   that   its   deployment   would   wreak  
constitutional  havoc  by  obliterating  the  hallowed  distinction  between  ‘appeal’  and  ‘review’.59  Yet  such  
predictions   have   proven  wide   of   the  mark.   Even   if  —   to   bastardize   the   title   of   Jeffrey   Jowell   and  
Anthony  Lester’s  pioneering  article60  —  proportionality  was  considered  25  or  so  years  ago  to  be  both  
novel  and  dangerous,  it  can  be,  and  is,  viewed  with  greater  equanimity  today.  On  this  view,  the  courts’  
experience  of  proportionality  review  under  the  HRA  has  served  to  normalize  and  demythologize  it  in  
a  way  that  sits  uncomfortably  with  its  characterisation  as  a  European  import  that  would  depart  the  
United  Kingdom’s  shores  in  the  course  of  a  process  of  de-­‐Europeanisation.    
However,  a  more  fundamental  point  remains  to  be  made,  which  is  that  there  is  clear  evidence  showing  
that  in  common-­‐law  rights  cases  the  proportionality  method  —  if  not  the  label  and  the  finer  points  of  
the  structure  of  the  test  —  was  in  fact  adopted  prior  to  the  HRA’s  activation.  In  other  words,  for  all  
that  concern  might  have  been  expressed  about  the  constitutional  dangers  of  proportionality  review  
in  cases  like  Brind,61  the  courts  were  actually  engaging  in  it,  albeit  without  explicitly  acknowledging  as  
much,  prior  to  and  independently  of  the  HRA.  This,  in  turn,  suggests  that  proportionality  —  or  at  least  
                                                                                                                          
56  Thomas   Poole,   The   Reformation   of   English   Administrative   Law’   (2009)   68   CLJ  142;  Michael   Taggart,  
‘Reinventing   Administrative   Law’   in  Nicholas   Bamforth   and   Peter   Leyland   (eds),  Public   Law   in   a  Multi-­‐
Layered  Constitution  (Hart  2003)  (cf  Michael  Taggart,  ‘Proportionality,  Deference,  Wednesbury’  [2008]  NZ  
L  Rev  423.    
57  Jason  Varuhas,  ‘The  Reformation  of  English  Administrative  Law?  ‘Rights’,  Rhetoric  and  Reality’  (2013)  72  
CLJ  369.    
58  R  (Association  of  British  Civilian  Internees  (Far  East  Region))  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Defence  [2003]  EWCA  
Civ  473,  [2003]  QB  1397.    
59  Brind  (n  8).  
60  Jeffrey  Jowell  and  Anthony  Lester,  ‘Proportionality:  Neither  Novel  Nor  Dangerous’  in  Jeffrey  Jowell  and  
Dawn  Oliver  (eds),  New  Directions  in  Judicial  Review  (Stevens  1988).    
61  Brind  (n  8).    
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key  aspects  of  it  —  is  not  so  much  an  innovation  that  would  be  capable  of  surviving  the  excision  of  
relevant  European  influences,  but  an  approach  that  has  pre-­‐European  roots  in  domestic  law.    
The  reasoning  in  Leech62  —  decided  prior  to  the  HRA’s  enactment  and  without  to  any  EU-­‐law  doctrine  
of  proportionality  —  is  instructive  in  this  regard.  Having  concluded  that,  as  noted  above,  the  question  
was  one  of  vires,  Steyn  LJ  went  on  to  construe  the  statute  in  order  to  determine  to  what  extent,  if  any,  
it  should  be  taken  to  authorize  the  making  of  rules  that  were  incompatible  with  the  common-­‐law  right  
of  access  to  court.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  interpretation  at  which  Steyn  LJ  arrived  which  is  significant  
for  present  purposes.  In  particular,  he  did  not  conclude  that  the  statute  straightforwardly  ruled  out  
any  administrative  rules  having  any  degree  of  impact  upon  the  relevant  right.  Rather,  he  construed  
the  statute  as  conferring  upon  the  relevant  constitutional  actor  only  such  authority  to  interfere  with  
the  right  as  could  be  justified  by  reference  to  an  ‘objective  need’.63  The  statute  was  thus  to  be  taken  
to   have   licensed   conduct   incompatible  with   the   right   only   to   the   extent   that   official   control   over  
correspondence  between  prisoners  and  solicitors  was  ‘in  the  interests  of  the  regulations  of  prisons’;64  
this,  said  Steyn  LJ,  demanded  the  existence  of  a  ‘self-­‐evident  and  pressing  need’.65  This  is  a  graphic  
illustration  of  the  potential  of  the  principle  of   legality.  While,  no  doubt  for  presentational  reasons,  
there  was  no  suggestion  that  a  free-­‐standing  proportionality  test  was  being  applied,  such  a  test  was  
in  effect   internalized  within  the  process  of  statutory  construction.  Secondary   legislation   interfering  
with  access   to   the  court   to  an  extent  greater   than  could  be  objectively   justified  by   reference   to  a  
pressing  need  would  be  unlawful  because  it  would  be  ultra  vires,  given  that  the  enabling  statute  had  
been  held  to  confer  only  the  authority  to  interfere  with  access  to  courts  to  a  justifiable  extent.    
Leech  is  not  an  isolated  example  of  proportionality  being  applied  at  common  law.  Indeed,  what  was  
implicit   in   Leech  was   explicit   in   Daly. 66   Although   often   interpreted   as   a   very   early   authoritative  
illustration  of  the  courts’  willingness  to  engage  in  proportionality  review  under  the  HRA,  Daly  was  in  
fact,  as  noted  above,  decided  at  common  law.  As  such,  the  explicit  use  made  of  proportionality  in  Daly  
falls  properly  to  be  understood  as  an  endorsement  of  its  capacity  to  operate  in  common-­‐law  rights,  as  
opposed  to  Convention  rights,  cases.  Nor  is  domestic  courts’  embrace  of  proportionality  limited  to  the  
common-­‐law   rights   context.   It   is   deployed   with   increasing   explicitness   in   (some)   substantive-­‐
legitimate-­‐expectation   cases, 67   while   the   Supreme   Court   has   recently   given   arguably   its   clearest  
indication  yet  that  proportionality  can  apply  in  cases  lacking  any  European  dimension  and  concerning  
a   fundamental   status   as   distinct   from   a   human   or   constitutional   right.68  It   is   unnecessary   for   the  
purpose  of  this  argument  to  finesse  away  the  fact  that  in  cases  concerning  common-­‐law  values  courts  
                                                                                                                          
62  Leech  (n  5).    
63  Leech  (n  5)  212.    
64  ibid.  
65  ibid.  Lord  Steyn  returned  to  the  notion  of  ‘pressing  social  need’  in  R  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  
Department,  ex  parte  Simms  [2000]  2  AC  115  (HL)  129.    
66  Daly  (n  18).  
67  Eg  R  v  North  and  East  Devon  Health  Authority,  ex  parte  Coughlan  [2001]  QB  213  (CA);  R  (Nadarajah)  v  
Secretary   of   State   for   the  Home  Department   [2005]   EWCA  Civ   1363;   Paponette   v   Attorney  General   of  
Trinidad  and  Tobago  [2010]  UKPC  32,  [2012]  1  AC  1.  
68  Pham  (n  43).  
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do  not  uniformly  have  recourse  to  proportionality.69  The  point,  rather,  is  that  there  is  a  clear  basis  in  
the   case   law   for   the   proposition   that   proportionality   is   something   that   can   and   does   legitimately  
operate  as  a  common-­‐law  review  tool,  such  that,  as  Sedley  LJ  put  it  in  Quila,  it  has  ‘a  life  of  its  own’70  
in  domestic  public  law.    
The  Human  Rights  Act,  the  Common  Law  and  the  Judicial  Function  
The  foregoing  analysis  suggests  that   if  the  HRA  were  to  be  repealed  —  and  even  if  the  ECHR  were  
withdrawn   from  —   the   conceptual   and   doctrinal   scaffolding   needed   for   a   recognizable   regime   of  
human-­‐rights  protection  would  not  thereby  be  dismantled.  Having  said  all  of  this,  however,  it  would  
be  counterfactual  to  suggest  that  the  HRA  has  made  no  difference.  At  the  very  least,  the  Act  has  had  
a  significant  emboldening  effect.  It  has,  for  instance,  caused  the  proportionality  test  to  emerge  from  
the   shadows. 71   The   Act   has   been   invoked   to   justify   sometimes-­‐unfamiliar   levels   of   judicial  
interventionism  —  as  it  was  by  Lord  Bingham  in  Belmarsh,  citing  the  ‘wholly  democratic  mandate’  that  
it   bequeaths   to   the   courts.72  And   the   sort   of   radical   interpretive   surgery   performed   in   cases   like  
Ghaidan  is  evidently  aided  by  the  courts’  ability  fall  back  on  the  argument  that  far  from  playing  fast  
and  loose  with  parliamentary  intention,  they  are  simply  fulfilling  the  intention  manifested  in  s  3(1)  of  
the  HRA.73  
The   reasons   for   greater   judicial   boldness   under   the   HRA   are   not   hard   to   fathom:   the   legislation  
furnishes  the  courts  with  a  ready-­‐made  defence  to  charges  of  unwarranted  judicial  activism,  enabling  
them  to  plead  the  implementation  of  Parliament’s  sovereign  will  when  accused  of  overstepping  the  
mark.  In  contrast,  common-­‐law  rights  and  their  enforcement  by  courts  are  necessarily  the  product  of  
something   other   than   parliamentary   intention.   As   such,   they   cannot   benefit   from   the   protective,  
democratic  cloak  afforded  to  the  Convention  rights  by  the  HRA.  While  this  might  be  thought  to  signify  
that   common-­‐law   rights   are   destined   to   remain   the   constitutional   inferior   of   their   Convention  
counterparts,  it  would  be  rash  to  hasten  to  such  a  conclusion.  Such  a  line  of  argument  presupposes  
that   the  Act  has   served   to  permit   courts   to  do   that  which  would  otherwise  be   improper;   that   the  
constitutional  licence  bestowed  by  the  Act  might  just  as  easily  be  revoked  by  means  of  its  repeal;  and  
that  the  permissive  effects  of  the  Act  —  being  legally  countercultural  —  are  strictly  confined  to  those  
matters  falling  within  its  legislative  parameters.  This  analysis  places  great  emphasis  upon  the  HRA  as  
an  agent  of  (limited)  legal  change,  characterising  it  as  something  that  sits  atop  regular  domestic  law  
whilst   leaving   the   underlying   architecture   of   the   constitution   fundamentally   unchanged.   It   is,  
however,  worth  exploring  an  alternative  narrative,  which  holds  that  the  Act  has  served  to  shine  a  light  
                                                                                                                          
69  For   discussion   of   ongoing   recourse   to   reasonableness   by   senior   courts,   see   Jason   Varuhas,   ‘Against  
Unification’   in   Hanna   Wilberg   and   Mark   Elliott   (eds),   The   Scope   and   Intensity   of   Substantive   Review:  
Traversing  Taggart’s  Rainbow  (Hart  2015)  109-­‐14.    
70  R  (Quila)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2010]  EWCA  Civ  1482,  [2011]  HRLR  11  [36].    
71  Daly  (n  18).  
72  A  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2004]  UKHL  56,  [2005]  2  AC  68  [42].    
73  Ghaidan  (n  46).    
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upon  latent  —  but  to  an  extent  unrealized  —  potential  within  the  common  law,  and  that  the  genie,  
now  that  it  is  out  of  the  bottle,  may  return  only  reluctantly,  if  at  all.74    
A  useful  vehicle  for  exploring  these  two  contrasting  narratives  is  supplied  by  the  sharp  disagreement  
between  Lords  Sumption  and  Kerr  in  the  case  of  Carlile.75  The  case  concerned  the  Home  Secretary’s  
refusal  to  allow  an   individual  to  enter  the  UK   in  order  to  address  parliamentarians,  the  conduct  of  
diplomatic  relations  and  attendant  national  security  concerns  being  cited  in  support  of  the  decision.  
The  judgment  reveals  a  broad  range  of  judicial  opinion  about  the  proper  role  of  the  court  in  such  a  
case.   At   one   end   of   the   spectrum   sits   Lord   Sumption.   Although   eschewing   the   language   of  
‘deference’,76  Lord  Sumption  adopted  an  approach  that  was  strikingly  abstemious.  Indeed,  he  went  
so  far  as  to  suggest  that,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  courts’  institutional  and  constitutional  
circumstances   dictated   not  merely   that   weight   be   ascribed   to   the   executive’s   view,   but   that   key  
aspects   of   the   proportionality   test  —   namely   necessity   and   fair   balance  —   should   be   abandoned  
entirely  in  favour  of  a  bare  rationality  assessment.77  In  contrast,  Lord  Kerr  —  dissenting  —  said  that  
the   courts  must   undertake   ‘fearless,   independent   review  of   the   justification   for   interference  with  
Convention  rights’78  and  that,  ultimately,   ‘[w]e  do  not  ask  whether   the  Secretary  of  State’s  view   is  
tenable;  we  ask  whether  it  is  right’.79    
On   one   level,   this   disagreement   appears   to   concern   the   effects   of   the   HRA.   Lord   Sumption,   for  
instance,   said   that   while   the   Act   may   to   some   extent   have   modified   pre-­‐existing   constitutional  
arrangements,  it  ‘did  not  abrogate  the  constitutional  distribution  of  powers  between  the  organs  of  
the   state’.80  In   contrast,   Lord  Kerr’s  understanding  of   the   constitutional   implications  of   the  HRA   is  
more   radical:   he   considers   courts   to   have   been   charged   by   Parliament  with   the   ‘solemn   duty’   to  
examine   not   only   ‘the   reasons   given   for   the   interference   [with   the   right]   but   also   to   decide   for  
themselves  whether  that  interference  is  justified’.81    
However,  on  reflection,  the  site  of  this  disagreement  must  lie  at  a  more  fundamental  level.  Any  debate  
about  whether  the  HRA  permits  this  or  that  degree  of  activism  —  whether  by  way  of  incursions  into  
formerly  ‘forbidden  areas’,82  radical  interpretation  or  more-­‐intensive  scrutiny  —  is  a  largely  arid  one.  
The  Act  does  not  tell  us  what  should  and  should  not  be  regarded  as  justiciable;  it  does  not  tell  us  what  
                                                                                                                          
74  This   is  not   to  suggest   that   in  developing  the  doctrine  of  common-­‐law  constitutional   rights  courts  are  
merely   discovering   rights   that   were   always   present.   Rather,   the   point   is   that   the   common   law,   as   an  
institution,  may  have  a  capacity  to  accommodate  rights-­‐protection  that  has  hitherto  remained  somewhat  
unexploited.    
75  R  (Carlile)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2014]  UKSC  60,  [2014]  3  WLR  1404.  
76  ibid  [22].  
77  ibid  [32].  
78  ibid  [176].  
79  ibid  [158].  
80  ibid  [28].  
81  ibid  [152]  (emphasis  in  original).    
82  The   term  used  by  Lord  Phillips  MR   in  R   (Abbasi)  v  Secretary  of  State   for  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  
Affairs  [2002]  EWCA  Civ  1598,  [2003]  UKHRR  76.  
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the  word  ‘possible’  in  s  3(1)  means;  and  it  has  nothing  to  say  about  the  intensity  of  review  save  that  it  
implicitly  requires  courts  to  have  recourse  to  proportionality  —  itself  a  catholic  notion  —  to  the  extent  
that  that  concept  inheres  in  certain  Convention  rights.  That  the  text  of  the  Act  is  not  dispositive  of  
such  matters   is  demonstrated  by   the  very  existence  of  disagreements   such  as   that  which  arose   in  
Carlile.    
What  really  underpins  the  difference  between  Lords  Sumption  and  Kerr  is  a  disagreement  about  the  
nature  of  the  judicial  role  itself.  Lord  Sumption  has  made  his  views  on  this  matter  crystal  clear,  both  
in  his  judgments  and  in  notable  extra-­‐curial  contributions,  including  his  F  A  Mann  Lecture.83  Although  
Lord   Sumption   is   susceptible   to   the   charge   that   he   attacks   a   straw   man   by   in   the   first   place  
mischaracterising   the  degree   to  which   judges  actually   intervene   in   the   ‘political’   realm,84  it   is   clear  
enough  that  he  views  the   judicial   role   in  highly   limited  terms.   It   is  unsurprising,   therefore,   that  he  
ascribes  a  conservative  interpretation  both  to  the  constitutional  implications  of  the  HRA  and  to  the  
pre-­‐existing  constitutional  arrangements  upon  which  it  operates  —  the  upshot  being  that,  for  Lord  
Sumption,   a   previously   limited   judicial   role   ought   not   to   be   understood   as   having   been   radically  
extended  by  the  Act.    
Lord  Kerr,  it  is  plain,  adopts  a  very  different  starting  point  —  one  that  influences  both  his  reading  of  
the  Act  and  of  the  underlying  constitutional  architecture.  While  he  does  not  downplay  the  relevance  
of   the  HRA  —  he  acknowledges   that   it   is   the  Act   that   requires  courts   to  determine   the   legality  of  
government  action  that  is  alleged  to  infringe  Convention  rights  —  he  insists  that  what  courts  do  under  
the  HRA  captures  something  that  is  inherent  within  their  role:    
Whether  executive  action  transgresses  a  Convention  right  …  and,  if  it  does,  the  importance  to  
be   attached   to   the   right   interfered   with   are   emphatically   matters   on   which   courts   are  
constitutionally  suited  to  make  judgments.    
Meanwhile,  although  Lord  Neuberger  adopted  an  intermediate  position  in  Carlile,  he  has,  speaking  
extra-­‐judicially,  said  that  the  powers  exercised  by  the  courts  under  the  HRA  ‘are  necessary  if  the  rule  
of  law  is  to  prevail’.85  This  implies  that,  in  line  with  Lord  Kerr,  Lord  Neuberger  takes  the  view  that  what  
the  courts  do  under  the  HRA  is  underpinned  by  constitutional  foundations  that  go  far  deeper  than  the  
Act  itself.  This  perception  is  reinforced  by  the  judgment  given  by  Lord  Neuberger  —  with  which  Lords  
Kerr  and  Reed  agreed  —  in  Evans,   in  which  the  role  of  the  judiciary  was  portrayed  as  a  function  of  
rule-­‐of-­‐law  values  that  are  constitutionally  innate.86    
                                                                                                                          
83  Jonathan  Sumption,  ‘Judicial  and  Political  Decision-­‐Making:  The  Uncertain  Boundary’  (F  A  Mann  Lecture,  
9   November   2011)   <http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/265505-­‐jonathan-­‐sumption-­‐mann-­‐
lecture.html>  accessed  25  March  2015.  See  also  Lord  Sumption,   ‘The  Limits  of   Law’   (Sultan  Azlan  Shah  
Lecture,   20   November   2013)   <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-­‐131120.pdf>   accessed   25  
March  2015.    
84  This  is  one  of  many  criticisms  of  Sumption’s  Mann  lecture  made  by  Sir  Stephen  Sedley,  ‘Judicial  Politics’  
(2012)  34  London  Review  of  Books  15.  
85  Neuberger  (n  28).  
86  Evans  (n  26)  [51]–[59].    
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It   follows   that   if  we  wish   to   appreciate   the   constitutional   implications  of   the  HRA  —  whether   the  
implications  of  its  enactment  or  the  potential  implications  of  its  repeal  —  we  must  look  beyond  it.  The  
reception  and  application  of  the  HRA  have  not  been  dry  matters  of  textual  analysis.  They  turn  at  least  
as  much  —  and  probably  far  more  —  on  prior  and  underlying  conceptions  of  the  judicial  function  and  
of  the  proper  relationship  between  the  courts  and  the  political  branches.  There  will  always  be  scope  
for  disagreement  about  the  answers  to  such  questions.  That   is  so  under  the  present  constitutional  
dispensation,  and  it  would  be  equally  so  if  the  notion  of  common-­‐law  rights  —  in  the  absence  of  the  
Act  or  the  Convention  —  were  to  go  it  alone.  However,  the  pre-­‐HRA  forms  of  protection  available  at  
common  law  —  together  with  the  deepening,  outside  the  rights  context,  of  prevailing  conceptions  of  
the  courts’  constitutional  role  in  the  decades  preceding  the  HRA’s  enactment  —  lend  at  least  some  
credence  to  the  positions  adopted  by  Lords  Kerr  and  Neuberger.  At  the  very  least,  the  correspondence  
identified  above  in  relation  to  the  protective  tools  deployed  at  common  law  and  under  the  HRA-­‐ECHR  
regime  suggests  that  what  the  courts  do  pursuant  to  the  latter  involves,  at  least  to  some  extent,  the  
performance  and  development  of  pre-­‐existing  and  innate,  as  opposed  to  wholly  novel  and  imposed,  
judicial  functions.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  HRA  is  no  more  than  a  decoration.  Its  impact  has  been  
real,  and  its  repeal  would  not  be  inconsequential.  But  it  would  be  naïve  to  suppose  that  the  HRA  has  
bestowed,   and   that   its   repeal   would   revoke,   a   set   of   judicial   functions   that   are   otherwise  
constitutionally   alien.   The   HRA   has   regularized   a   relatively   bold   approach   to   human-­‐rights  
adjudication,  and  has  provided  a  convenient  response  to  charges  of  judicial  overreach;  and  without  
the  democratic  shield  afforded  them  by  the  Act,  the  courts  would  undoubtedly  be  more  exposed.  But  
the  convenience  of  the  shield  does  not  imply  its  indispensability.    
Constitutional  resilience  
In   the   absence   of   the   HRA,   then,   the   common   law   would   continue   to   supply   a   basis   for   judicial  
enforcement   of   whatever   rights   are   recognized   at   common   law,   by   reference   to   techniques   —  
including  the  ultra  vires  concept,  statutory  interpretation  and  the  imposition  upon  public  authorities  
of  a  justificatory  burden  —  that  bear  some  resemblance  to  the  contents  of  the  courts’  HRA  toolkit.  
However,  even  if  this  analysis  is  accepted,  a  further  question  —  concerning  constitutional  resilience  
—  remains.    
Viewed  from  one  perspective,  common-­‐law  and  Convention  rights  are  broadly  similar  in  terms  of  their  
constitutional   resilience.  Both  must  yield   in   the  face  of   implacably   inconsistent  primary   legislation,  
meaning   that   the   sovereignty   of   Parliament   circumscribes   the   resilience   of   both   forms   of   rights.  
However,  this  analysis,  although  accurate  as  far  as  it  goes,  does  not  go  far  enough.  This  argument  will  
be  developed  in  two  stages.  First,  it  will  be  shown  that  the  resilience  of  Convention  rights  under  the  
HRA   is   substantially   greater   than   the   foregoing      analysis   implies.   Second,   although   the  position  at  
common  law  is  quite  different,  an  analogical  argument  will  be  developed  to  the  effect  that  common-­‐
law  rights  may  nevertheless  enjoy  a  greater  degree  of  constitutional  security  than  an  orthodox  analysis  
would  suggest.    
Convention  Rights  and  Common-­‐Law  Rights  Compared  
When  a  remedy  is  granted  by  a  UK  court  in  respect  of  Convention  rights,  the  legal  effect  is  necessarily  
limited.  In  the  case  of  a  declaration  of  incompatibility  under  s  4  of  the  HRA,  the  legal  effect  is  non-­‐
existent  save  that  the  power  to  make  a  ‘fast-­‐track’  amendment  is  thereby  triggered.  If,  on  the  other  
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hand,  an  interpretive  remedy  is  issued  by  means  of  a  construction  rendered  under  s  3,  although  the  
burden   of   inertia   is   allocated   differently,   the   remedy   is   ultimately   reversible   in   that   it   is   open   to  
Parliament  as  a  matter  of  domestic  law  to  re-­‐enact  the  relevant  provision  in  terms  clear  enough  to  
defy  consistent  construction.  However,  this  analysis  overlooks  the  crucial  fact  that  the  constitutional  
resilience  of  Convention  rights  defies  calibration  in  exclusively  domestic-­‐law  terms,  the  international-­‐
law  purchase  of  such  rights  generally  investing  adjudication  under  the  HRA  with  a  degree  of  legal  bite  
that  adjudication  at  common  law  appears  to  lack.    
Such   bite   flows   from   the   fact   the   UK   is   subject   to   binding   international   obligations   to   secure   to  
everyone  within  its  jurisdiction  the  rights  set  out  in  the  Convention87  and  to  abide  by  judgments  issued  
by  the  Strasbourg  Court.88  Of  course,  although  it  is  likely,  it  is  not  inevitable  that  official  defiance  in  
the  face  of  a  domestic  judgment  would  trigger  an  application  to  that  Court;  and  it   is  not  inevitable  
that,   if   such   an   application  were   to  be  made,   the   ECtHR  would   reach   the   same   conclusion   as   the  
domestic  court.  These  two  possibilities  are  different  in  type.  The  former  turns  not  upon  the  extent  of  
the  UK’s  obligations  under  the  Convention,  but  upon  practical  happenstance  such  as  the  inclination  
and  financial  capacity  of  the  party  to  take  the  case  further.  The  latter  possibility,  in  contrast,  reflects  
the   extent   of   the  UK’s   international   obligations,   acknowledging,   for   instance,   the   chance   that   the  
Strasbourg   Court   might   interpret   the   Convention   differently   or   hold   that   the   impugned   national  
legislation  to  fall  within  the  margin  of  appreciation.  Indeed,  it  is  even  possible  for  a  domestic  court  to  
rule  that  a  given  statutory  provision  should  be  considered  to  breach  the  Convention  right  when  the  
matter  is  viewed  from  a  domestic  perspective,  while  simultaneously  acknowledging  that  the  measure  
might  survive  scrutiny  in  Strasbourg  on  account  of  the  likelihood  of  that  Court  extending  a  margin  of  
appreciation  broader  than  the  corresponding  margin  afforded  at  the  domestic  level  by  means  of  the  
doctrine  of  deference.  The  Nicklinson  case  highlights  precisely  this  possibility.89  But  while,  for  these  
reasons,   domestic   relief   under   the   HRA   does   not   inevitably   mean   that   the   UK   is   (viewed   from  
Strasbourg’s  perspective)  in  breach  of  its  obligations  under  the  Convention  or  that  binding  Strasbourg  
adjudication  will  ensue,  it  generally  means  those  things.  And  it  follows  that  to  postulate  that  the  UK  
Parliament  is  free  —  by  dint  of  the  doctrine  of  legislative  supremacy  —  to  ignore  s  4  declarations  and  
reverse  s  3  interpretations  implies  an  unduly  blinkered  view.    
This   is   not   to   suggest   that   Convention   rights   can   straightforwardly   be   regarded   as   limits   upon  
Parliament’s  authority  (and,  hence,  as  an  impediment  to  parliamentary  sovereignty).  The  position  is  
more   complex   than   this,   because   the   parliamentary   sovereignty   and   the   Convention   rights   exist,  
respectively,   upon   domestic   and   international   legal   planes   that,   even   if   not  wholly   unrelated,   are  
ultimately  distinct.  Indeed,  it  is  in  this  analysis  that  the  subtlety  of  the  HRA  regime  resides.  When,  for  
instance,  a  declaration  of  incompatibility  is  issued,  the  domestic  court  is  effectively  signalling  that  the  
legislation   in   question,   although   valid   as   a  matter   of   national   law,   is   unlawful   judged   against   the  
benchmark  of  the  ECHR  which  is  binding  upon  the  UK  in  international  law.90  And  while  this  does  not  
call  into  question  the  sovereignty  of  Parliament,  it  does  indicate  that  Parliament’s  legislative  action  
                                                                                                                          
87  ECHR,  art  1  
88  ECHR,  art  46(1).  
89  R  (Nicklinson)  v  Ministry  of  Justice  [2014]  UKSC  38,  [2014]  3  WLR  200.    
90  A  similar  point  can  be  made  in  relation  to  a  s  3  interpretation,  the  implication  of  which  is  that  unless  
Parliament  is  prepared  to  accept  the  interpreted  rendered  by  the  court,  UK  law  will  be  incompatible.    
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has   consequences   that   sound   in   another   —   international   —   sphere.   This   does   not   remove   the  
distinction  between  the  two  spheres,  but  it  does  erode  it.  In  particular,  it  permits  obligations  that  are  
binding  as  a  matter  of  international  law  to  occupy  a  place  on  the  domestic  constitutional  stage,  and  
thus  to  steal  some  of  the  limelight  from  the  doctrine  of  parliamentary  sovereignty.  This  is  different  
from   saying   that   the   doctrine   is   undermined:   the   point,   rather,   is   that   the   adoption   of   a   wider  
perspective  is  forced,  thus  placing  in  sharp  relief  the  inevitable  parochialism  of  what  is  necessarily  a  
domestic-­‐legal  construct.   In   this  way,   the  perennial  conundrum  —  who  has   the   last  word?  —  that  
arises  whenever  fundamental  rights  and  legislative  authority  are  juxtaposed,  far  from  being  resolved  
by  the  HRA,  is  sidestepped.  This  is  facilitated  by,  in  effect,  outsourcing  to  the  Convention  machinery  
the   ultimate   task   of   safeguarding   rights.   That   machinery   serves,   in   one   sense,   as   a   final-­‐resort  
guarantee  of  rights  —  yet  one  that  does  not  directly  cut  across  the  domestic  sovereignty  principle.    
It   is   against   this   background   that   the   characterisation   of   HRA   remedies   as   ‘dialogic’   falls   to   be  
considered.91  On  the  face  of   it,   the  Act  —  by  withholding  from  the  courts  any  form  of  strike-­‐down  
power  —  is  quintessentially  dialogic.  Yet  such  domestic  remedies  acquire  a  schizophrenic  character  
because  they  are  parasitic  upon  rights  that  bite  in   international   law  and  which  may  attract  binding  
Strasbourg   adjudication.   For   this   reason,   the   HRA   is   significantly   inconsistent   with   the   ‘new  
Commonwealth  model  of   constitutionalism’  developed  by   Stephen  Gardbaum,   two  key   aspects  of  
which  are  ‘weak-­‐form  judicial  review’  and  the  assignment  to  the  legislative  branch  of  the  ‘final  word’.92  
While   it   is  possible  to  ascribe  such  characteristics  to  the  HRA  regime  when  it   is  viewed  through  an  
exclusively  domestic  lens,  the  same  is  clearly  not  true  when  an  international-­‐law  lens  is  applied.93    
This   analysis   suggests   a   fundamental   distinction   not   only   between   the   HRA-­‐ECHR   regime   and  
Gardbaum’s  model,  but  a  further,  and  equally  stark,  distinction  between  that  regime  and  the  doctrine  
of   common-­‐law   constitutional   rights.   Under   the   HRA,   the   possibility   of   reversal   —   by   means   of  
Parliament   either   ignoring   a   declaration   of   incompatibility   or   replacing   a   compatibly   interpreted  
provision  with   one   that   defies   a   construction   consistent  with   the   relevant   right  —   is   slight,   being  
heavily  qualified  by  the  ultimately  binding  nature  of  the  ECHR.  In  contrast,  the  possibility  of  reversal  
at  common  law  is  —  or  at  least  appears  to  be  —  far  greater.  In  this  respect94    the  system  of  common-­‐
law  rights   is  closer   to  Gardbaum’s  model   than   is   the  HRA-­‐ECHR  regime,   the   ‘final  word’   remaining  
more  obviously  with   the   legislature,   and   judicial   review  being  more   clearly   ‘weak-­‐form’   in  nature.  
Judicial  application  of  common-­‐law  rights   is   thus,   it   seems,  more  unambiguously  dialogic  —   in   the  
sense  that  judicial  review  is  weak-­‐form  in  nature  —  than  is  judicial  application  of  Convention  rights  via  
the  HRA.  That  this  is  so  seems  to  flow  naturally  from  the  fact  that  common-­‐law  rights  —  unlike  their  
Convention   counterparts   —   occupy   the   same,   domestic,   constitutional   space   as   the   doctrine   of  
parliamentary   sovereignty.   As   such,   that   doctrine   appears   to   form   an   absolute   limit   upon   the  
constitutional  resilience  of  common-­‐law  rights.    
                                                                                                                          
91  See  generally  Tom  Hickman,  Public  Law  After  the  Human  Rights  Act  (Hart  2010)  ch  3.    
92  Stephen  Gardbaum,  The  New   Commonwealth  Model   of   Constitutionalism:   Theory   and   Practice   (CUP  
2013)  ch  2.    
93  Gardbaum  acknowledges,  but  arguably  underplays  this  significance  of,  this  point.  See  eg  ibid  195.      
94  But,  admittedly,  not  in  certain  others.    
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Parliamentary  Sovereignty  and  Constitutional  Indeterminacy  
However,   it   is  worth   pausing   to   consider  whether   this   orthodox   account   adequately   captures   the  
nature  —   and   full   subtlety  —   of   the   relationship   between   common-­‐law   rights   and   the   legislative  
authority  of  Parliament.  This  question  can  best  be  explored  by  reflecting  upon  the  principal  vehicle  —  
namely,  interpretation  —  that  is  available  to  courts  seeking  to  uphold  rights  at  common  law.  There  is,  
of  course,  a  well-­‐explored  normative  dimension  to  this  question.  Trevor  Allan,   for   instance,  argues  
that   interpretation   is   a   device   so   potent,   and   the   distinction   between   it   and   judicial   invalidation  
ultimately  so  barren,  as  to  foreclose  the  possibility  of  properly  construed  legislation  impinging  upon  
fundamental  rights  (or  values).95  However,  my  purpose  here  is  not  to  engage  in  that  normative  debate,  
but   to   suggest   that   the   factual  possibility  of   judicial   disobedience   to   statute,  whether  explicitly  or  
under  the  cover  of  interpretation,  is  in  itself  a  consideration  that  must  be  taken  into  account  when  
attempting  to  understand  how  legislation  and  common-­‐law  rights  and  values  relate  to  one  another.  
This,  it  will  be  argued,  highlights  what  can  simultaneously  be  considered  the  potential  and  the  limits  
of  common-­‐law  rights  viewed  in  terms  of  their  constitutional  resilience.    
A  useful   starting-­‐point   is   the  oral  evidence  given  by  Lord  Phillips   to   the  House  of  Commons  Select  
Committee  on  Political  and  Constitutional  Reform.96  In  the  course  of  a  discussion  about  the  prospect  
of   judicial   strike-­‐down   of   ‘unconstitutional’   legislation,   Lord   Phillips   indicated   that   before   such   a  
possibility  —  which  would  precipitate  a  ‘constitutional  crisis’  —  were  contemplated,  the  courts  would  
first  have  resorted  to  interpretive  tools,  even  if  this  amounted  to  ascribing  to  the  relevant  provision  
‘an   interpretation   it  …  couldn’t  bear’.97  Such  a  step,  said  Lord  Phillips,  would  be   justified  by  dint  of  
being  a  constitutionally  seemly  way  of  the  court  seeking  to  throw  ‘the  gauntlet  back  to  Parliament’.98  
This,  said  Lord  Phillips,  would  be  tantamount  to  the  Court  saying  to  legislators:  ‘We  have  pulled  you  
back  from  the  brink.  Are  you  really  going  to  persist  with  this?’  This,  he  said,  ‘is  what  the  House  of  Lords  
did  in  Anisminic’.99  
Lord  Phillips  does  not  —  at  least  in  these  remarks  —  commit  himself  to  a  normative  position  on  the  
question   of  whether   courts   or   Parliament   ought   to   have   the   final  word   in   situations   of   this   type.  
Rather,  his  observation  is  empirical  in  nature,  and  amounts  to  a  particular  conception  of  interpretation  
as  a  remedial  tool.  Taken  to  its  logical  conclusion,  Lord  Phillips’s  analysis  of  interpretation  results  in  its  
characterization  as   a   soft-­‐form  of   strike  down  power:  one   that   facilitates   judicial   neutralization  of  
constitutionally  offensive  legislative  provisions,  subject  to  the  possibility  of  Parliament’s  taking  up  the  
gauntlet  by  re-­‐enacting  the  provision  in  yet-­‐starker  terms.  This  raises  some  obvious  questions.  What  
happens  if  Parliament  does  take  up  the  gauntlet?  Are  the  courts  obliged  to  roll  over  if  it  does?  And,  if  
so,  does  judicial  review  pursuant  to  common-­‐law  rights  remains  essentially  weak-­‐form  in  nature  —  
                                                                                                                          
95  Trevor  Allan,  The  Sovereignty  of  Law:  Freedom,  Constitution  and  Common  Law  (OUP  2013)  chs  4–5.    
96   Political   and   Constitutional   Reform   Committee,   Constitutional   Role   of   the   Judiciary   if   there   were   a  
Written  Constitution  (HC  2013–14,  802)  16–17.    
97  ibid.    
98  ibid.    
99  ibid.  The  approach  of  Lords  Kerr,  Neuberger  and  Reed  in  Evans  (n  26)  is  arguably  a  further  —  if  less  stark  
—  example  of  such  counter-­‐textual  interpretation,  albeit  that  Evans  was  a  case  that  was  concerned  not  
explicitly  with  constitutional  rights  but  with  constitutional  principles.    
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consistent,  in  this  aspect,  with  Gardbaum’s  paradigm,100  and  distinct  from  the  stronger-­‐form  review  
available  under  the  HRA?      
In  seeking  to  navigate  these  issues,  two  possible  approaches  arise.  One  involves  seeking  to  supply  a  
decisive   answer   to   the   question   what   would   happen   if   the   courts   and   Parliament   were   to   find  
themselves  locked  in  the  sort  of  constitutional  struggle  envisaged  by  Lord  Phillips.  The  difficulty  with  
this   approach   is   that   it   seeks   to   supply   false   certainty   in   relation   to   a   matter   that   is   inherently  
indeterminate,  a  considerable  diversity  of  normative  opinion  being  reflected  in  conflicting  descriptive  
accounts  of  the  constitutional  status  quo.  It  is  true  that  some  senior  judges  —  including  Justices  of  the  
Supreme  Court  —  are  today  prone  to  expressing  less-­‐than-­‐fulsome  support  for  the  notion  of  wholly  
unconstrained  legislative  authority  in  a  way  and  with  an  explicitness  that  would  have  been  surprising,  
even  shocking,  until  relatively  recently.101  A  very  recent  example  is  supplied  by  Lord  Hodge’s  judgment  
in  Moohan,   in   which   he  was   unwilling   to   exclude   the   possibility   that   if   ‘a   parliamentary  majority  
abusively  sought  to  entrench  its  power  by  a  curtailment  of  the  franchise  or  similar  device,  the  common  
law,  informed  by  principles  of  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law  and  international  norms,  would  be  able  
to  declare  such  legislation  unlawful’.102  But  this  is  a  far-­‐from-­‐universal  view  among  the  senior  judiciary,  
Lord   Neuberger,   for   instance,   having   unambiguously   said   extra-­‐judicially   that   ‘it   is   clear   that  
parliamentary  sovereignty  is  absolute’.103      
Attempting   to   resolve   the   tension   between   the   empirical   positions   adopted   by   Lords   Hodge   and  
Neuberger   is  an  ultimately  futile  endeavour  at   least  at  the  present  time,  since  the  choice  between  
them  turns  upon  a  chapter  in  the  UK’s  constitutional  story  that  is  presently  —  and  may  permanently  
remain  —  unwritten.  In  the  absence  of  a  constitutional  crisis  of  the  type  contemplated  by  Lord  Phillips,  
the  opportunity  simply  has  not  arisen  for  it  to  be  determined  whether  legislative  abrogation  or  judicial  
enforcement  of  a  fundamental  constitutional  right  or  value  would  prevail  in  the  event  of  explicit  inter-­‐
institutional  conflict.  I  have  argued  elsewhere  that  the  inherent  indeterminacy  implied  by  this  analysis  
can  —  and  should  —  be  perceived  not  as  a  constitutional  deficiency  but  as  a  constitutional  feature:  
one  that  promotes  comity  and  serves  to  discourage  both  sides  from  trespassing  beyond  the  brink.104  
Rather  than  problematizing  this  inherent  ambiguity  in  our  constitutional  order,  we  have  no  choice  but  
to  embrace  it  —  and  to  seek  to  understand  its  implications  for  the  institutional  relationship  between  
the   judicial  and  political  branches.  Viewed   in  terms  of  the  constitutional  resilience  of  common-­‐law  
rights,  such  indeterminacy  cautions  against  ready  judicial   invocation  of  the  putative  nuclear  option  
contemplated  by  Lord  Hodge,  as  well  as  against  legislative  retaliation  in  the  event  of  the  sort  of  soft  
strike-­‐down   envisaged   by   Lord   Phillips.   The   upshot   is   that   such   interpretive   activism   acquires   a  
                                                                                                                          
100  Gardbaum  (n  92).    
101  Eg  R  (Jackson)  v  Attorney  General  [2005]  UKHL  56,  [2006]  1  AC  262  [102]  (Lord  Steyn),  [104]–[107]  (Lord  
Hope),  [159]  (Lady  Hale);  AXA  General  Insurance  Ltd  v  HM  Advocate  [2011]  UKSC  46,  [2012]  1  AC  868  [50]  
(Lord  Hope).    
102  Moohan  v  Lord  Advocate  [2014]  UKSC  67,  [2015]  2  WLR  141  [35]  .  
103  Lord  Neuberger,  ‘Who  are  the  masters  now?’  (Lord  Alexander  of  Weedon  Lecture,  6  April  2011).    
104   Mark   Elliott,   ‘The   Principle   of   Parliamentary   Sovereignty   in   Legal,   Constitutional,   and   Political  
Perspective’  in  Jeffrey  Jowell,  Dawn  Oliver  and  Colm  O’Cinneide  (eds),  The  Changing  Constitution  (8th  edn,  
OUP  2015).    
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constitutional  edge,   thanks   to   the  veiled  possibility  of   judicial   retaliation   in   the  event  of   legislative  
escalation.    
The   picture   so   far   as   common-­‐law   rights   is   concerned   is   thus   complex,   viewed   in   terms   of   its  
relationship   with   both   Gardbaum’s   model   and   the   HRA-­‐ECHR   regime.   So   far   as   the   former   is  
concerned,  the  extent  to  which  judicial  review  pursuant  to  common-­‐law  rights  can  be  characterized  
as   weak-­‐form,   and   the   legislature   considered   to   have   the   final   word,   becomes   the   subject   of  
uncertainty.  Equally,  the  supposition  that  common-­‐law  rights  are  more  constitutionally  fragile  than  
HRA-­‐ECHR  rights  becomes  questionable,   the  sort  of   interpretive  strategy   identified  by  Lord  Phillips  
implying  a  capacity  on  the  part  of  the  courts  to  send  across  Parliament’s  bows  a  warning  shot  at  least  
as  potent  as  that  entailed  by  a  declaration  of  incompatibility.  Indeed,  a  form  of  symmetry  emerges:  
neither   an   HRA   declaration   nor   a   radical   common-­‐law   interpretation   explicitly   calls   into   question  
Parliament’s  sovereign  capacity  to  have  the  final  word,  yet  each  hints  at  the  constitutional  difficulties  
likely  to  be  precipitated  should  it  seek  to  press  its  putative  legal  right  to  do  so.    
There  are,  however,  dangers  in  seeking  to  take  this  analysis  too  far.  The  HRA  has  served  to  normalize  
the  notion  of  judicial  review  of  primary  legislation:  rendering  an  interpretation  pursuant  to  s  3  of  the  
HRA  or   issuing  a  declaration  of   incompatibility  under  s  4  are  steps  which,  while  relatively  rare,  are  
unexceptional.   And   every   time   a   court   takes   such   a   step,   the   underwriting   effect   of   the   ECHR   is  
triggered,  such  that  —  subject  to  the  relatively  slight  possibility  of  the  Strasbourg  Court  adopting  a  
more-­‐lenient  approach  —  Parliament  becomes  unambiguously  boxed  in  as  a  matter  of  international  
law.  The  position   in   relation  to  common-­‐law  rights   is  clearly  different   in   two  senses.  First,   there   is  
nothing  unambiguous  about  the  potentially  constraining  effect  of  common-­‐law  review:  its  existence  
is,  at  best,  putative.  Second,  even  if  the  possibility  were  to  exist,  the  indications  are  that  courts  relying  
upon  common-­‐law  rights  or  values  would  risk  precipitating  a  constitutional  crisis  —  by  assigning  to  a  
provision  a  meaning  it  could  not  textually  bear  and  subsequently  exhibiting  disobedience  in  the  face  
of  legislative  retaliation  to  such  an  interpretive  adventure  —  only  in  extreme  circumstances.  This  is  
evidenced  by  the  fact  that  judicial  speculation  about  the  possibility  of  strike-­‐down  or  non-­‐application  
of   primary   legislation   is   almost   invariably   accompanied   by   the   provision   of   lavishly   extravagant  
examples  such  as  a  full-­‐frontal  assault  upon  the  basic  tenets  of  democracy105  or  the  evisceration  of  
the  courts’  powers  of  judicial  review.106    
This  suggests  that  in  order  for  even  the  prospect  of  judicial  disobedience  to  statute  to  arise,  the  right  
in  question  must  be  especially  fundamental  and  the  breach  of  it  so  egregious  as  to  strike  at  its  very  
heart.  It  follows  that  while  common-­‐law  rights  may  —  rarely  —  have  the  potential  to  exert  the  sort  of  
constraining  effect  upon  Parliament  that  that  Convention  rights  have,  that  potential  would  likely  only  
ever  be  realized  in  extremis.    This  takes  us  full  circle,  to  the  relationship  between  the  three  vectors  of  
human-­‐rights   adjudication   —   concerning   normative   reach,   protective   rigour   and   constitutional  
resilience  —  identified  at  the  beginning  of  this  article.  If  a  common-­‐law  right  were  ever  to  turn  out  to  
be  an  absolute  brake  upon  legislative  authority,  the  likelihood  is  that  it  would  have  to  lie  dead  centre  
within  the  normative  core  of  common-­‐law  rights.  Only  then  —  if  ever  —  would  be  it  possible  to  begin  
to  contemplate  the  ascription  to  the  right  of  a  degree  of  resilience  that  would  warrant  its  protection  
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106  Eg  Jackson  (n  101).    
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in  the  face  of  flatly,  even  explicitly,  inconsistent  legislation.  This  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  position  
that  obtains  under  the  HRA  which,  in  this  respect,  is  an  essentially  monolithic  one,  the  constraining  
force  of  the  Convention  machinery  being  implicated  whenever  a  domestic  court  takes  remedial  action,  
whether  by  means  of  interpretation  or  declaration.    
Concluding  Remarks  
What,  then,  is  the  relationship  between  common-­‐law  and  HRA-­‐ECHR  rights,  and  to  what  extent  might  
the  former  be  a  substitute  for  the  latter?  It  would  be  naïve  to  suggest  that  common-­‐law  rights  could  
seamlessly  step  in  if  the  HRA  were  repealed  or  if  the  UK  resiled  from  the  Convention.  The  differences  
between  the  regimes  are  such  that  one  cannot  simply  stand  in  for  the  other.  The  normative  reach  of  
the  common  law  traditionally  was  —  and  probably  still  is  —  more  modest  than  that  of  the  Convention.  
The   rigour   of   the   protective   techniques   available   under   the   Act   has   not   always   been   imitated   at  
common  law.  And  Convention  rights   (at   least   for  as   long  as  the  UK   is  a  party  to  the  treaty)  have  a  
degree   of   constitutional   resilience   that   their   common-­‐law   counterparts   do   not   (at   least  
straightforwardly  and  uniformly)  enjoy.  The  courts’  protective  commitment  to  —  and  the  resulting  
degree  of  constitutional  resilience  enjoyed  by  —  rights  lying  at  or  near  the  common  law’s  normative  
core  may  confer  upon  those  rights  a  degree  of  legal  security  approximating  to  that  which  is  associated  
with  Convention  rights  under  the  HRA;  but  the  same  cannot  plausibly  claimed  of  the  whole  range  of  
rights  (and  values)  acknowledged  at  common  law.    
Nevertheless,  it  would  be  mistaken  to  suppose  that  domestic  courts  would  be  powerless  to  uphold  
fundamental  rights  if  they  were  to  be  denied  the  instruments  presently  placed  at  their  disposal  by  the  
Act.  The  common  law’s  normative  reach  may  well  be  more  limited  than  the  Convention’s  —  but  the  
common  law  is  a  dynamic   institution  that  has  not  stood  still   these  past  15  years.  The  Act  explicitly  
equips  courts  with  protective  tools  in  a  way  that  the  common  law  does  not.  Yet  the  protective  regime  
enshrined  in  the  Act  echoes,  even  if  it  does  not  simply  reproduce,  that  which  is  found  at  common  law,  
in  terms  of  the  conceptual  basis  of  protection,  reliance  upon  statutory  construction  and  recourse  to  
forms  of  justificatory  scrutiny  that  amount  to  or  take  the  form  of  proportionality  review.  And  although  
common-­‐law   rights   may   not   unambiguously   possess   the   constitutional   resilience   enjoyed   by  
Convention  rights,  it  does  not  follow,  for  the  reasons  considered,  that  common-­‐law  rights  should  be  
taken  to  be  universally  fragile  in  the  face  of  constitutionally  inimical  legislation.    
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  HRA  has  not  made  any  difference;  it  clearly  has.  But  a  question  remains  
about  how  we  are  to  characterize  the  difference  it  has  made.  Three  possibilities  arise.  The  first  depicts  
the  Act  as  an  exotic  bird  sitting  atop  and  apart  from  the  common  law,  leaving  no  perceptible  imprint  
and  ready  to  be  spirited  away  at  the  stroke  of  a  legislative  pen.  For  reasons  explored  in  this  article,  
such  a  view  is  untenable:  it  misunderstands  both  the  contextual  background  against  which  the  HRA  
was  enacted  and  the  cross-­‐fertilization  of  domestic  law  that  has  taken  place  under  its  influence.      
A  second  possibility  involves  the  portrayal  of  the  Act  as  having  effected  enduring  transformation  of  
the   common   law.   There   is  more  mileage   in   this   view.   Succour   is   given   to   it   by,   for   example,   the  
phenomenon,  discussed  earlier,  of  the  absorption  of  certain  Convention  rights  into  the  common  law,  
and  the  emboldening  effect  that  the  Act  has  had.  However,  this  depiction  of  the  Act’s  impact  is  also  
deficient  —   or   at   least   incomplete.   The   language,   and   the   notion,   of   transformation   is   ultimately  
inapposite  because  it  depicts  the  common  law  and  the  Convention  as  polar  opposites,  the  latter  taking  
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the   form  of  an   influence  that,  even   if   it  has  not  proven  transitory,  was,   to  begin  with,   foreign  and  
strange.  The  reality,  however,  is  that  to  the  extent  that  the  Act  has  effected  change,  it  has  succeeded  
in  doing  so  because  in  the  common  law  it  has  found  a  willing  partner.    
This  points  to  a  third  —  and  preferable  —  mode  of  characterisation.  When  we  consider  the  degree  of  
correspondence  that  exists  between  the  common-­‐law  and  HRA  regimes,  we  find  that  the  relationship  
is  not  a  one-­‐way  street.  In  the  HRA  model  we  find  aspects  of  norms,  practices  and  approaches  that  
were  already  to  some  degree  evident  at  common  law,  albeit  that  they  are  perhaps  reflected  in  the  Act  
in  a  crisper,  starker  form.  It  would  be  going  much  too  far  to  suggest  that  the  HRA  is  a  mirror  that  can  
be  held  up  to  the  common  law  so  as  to  reveal  what  it  has  really  been  all  along.  But  there  is  nevertheless  
a  grain  of  truth  in  that  metaphor.  If  the  common  law  has  been  invigorated  by  the  Act,  then  that,  at  
least  in  part,  is  because  the  Act  has  served  to  highlight  the  capacity  of  the  common  law.  And  it  is  this  
deepening  of  our  appreciation  of  the  nature  and  potential  of  the  courts’  inherent  constitutional  role  
that  will  be  the  enduring  legacy  of  the  Act,  however  long  or  short  its  remaining  time  on  the  statute  
book  might  be.    
